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Exposing the Traditional Marriage Agenda 
Jessica Feinberg* 
ABSTRACT 
The success of a social justice movement, especially with regard to issues upon 
which the public will be voting, depends in significant part on how the issues are defined 
or framed. Anti-same-sex marriage campaigns frequently urge voters to vote in favor of 
laws defining marriage as between a man and a woman in order to “protect traditional 
marriage.” Instead of framing the issue as a question of whether individuals of the same 
sex should be banned from marrying, anti-same-sex marriage campaigns often frame the 
issue as a question of whether traditional marriage should be protected from redefinition. 
This strategy has proven successful for anti-same-sex marriage campaigns. However, 
same-sex marriage opponents rarely have been challenged with regard to the meaning of 
“traditional marriage.” In exploring the history of marriage within the United States, it 
becomes clear that, contrary to the understanding of the term held by the general public, 
traditional marriage consists of much more than opposite-sex spouses. The requirements 
of traditional marriage also include permanence, gender roles, monogamy, and 
procreation. As it turns out, the leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations are well 
aware of these other requirements of traditional marriage and do a significant amount of 
work to protect them—work about which the public remains largely unaware. This 
Article argues that exposing the true meaning of traditional marriage and the leading 
anti-same-sex marriage organizations’ efforts to protect the other requirements of 
traditional marriage would be a helpful strategy for pro-same-sex marriage campaigns. 
Specifically, it would give same-sex marriage proponents an effective response to the 
argument that people should vote against same-sex marriage in order to protect 
traditional marriage and provide pro-same-sex marriage campaigns with a compelling 
new way to frame the issue. 
                                                
* Assistant Professor, Mercer University School of Law. I am extremely grateful to Nancy Polikoff and 
Gary Simson for their insightful feedback on earlier drafts of this Article.  Thank you also to Lindsay 
Bozicevich, Bill Eskridge, Nan Hunter, Dylan Malagrinò, and Tony Varona for providing helpful 
comments and critique.  The idea for this Article came from my work years ago as a Fellow in the 
Organizing and Training Department of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force. The grassroots 
organizers, who work tirelessly day and night, often going door-to-door to speak to complete strangers 
about why they, their family members, or their friends deserve the right to marry the people they love, 
continue to inspire me. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The success of a social justice movement, especially with regard to issues upon 
which the public will be voting, depends in significant part on how the issues are defined 
or framed.1 Often, each side puts forth multiple frames for an issue when a controversial 
policy question is being debated.2 The individuals and organizations leading the charge to 
ban same-sex marriage frequently justify their position as necessary to protect what they 
refer to as “traditional marriage” from redefinition (“the protection frame”).3 That is, 
rather than framing the issue as a question of whether to ban individuals of the same sex 
from marrying, anti-same-sex marriage campaigns frame the issue as a question of 
whether to protect traditional marriage from redefinition.4 Interestingly, however, the 
fight to protect traditional marriage did not begin in response to the perceived threat of 
same-sex marriage. In fact, for most of the nation’s history, organizations and individuals 
have been decrying a marriage problem,5 and taking positions on various marriage-
related issues in order to protect traditional marriage.6 This then raises the question—
what exactly is this institution that requires so much protection? More specifically, what 
is traditional marriage? 
                                                
1 SCOTT BARCLAY ET AL., QUEER MOBILIZATIONS: LGBT ACTIVISTS CONFRONT THE LAW 208–210, 229–
30 (2009). 
2 Id. at 210–11, 214, 234, 247. 
3 See, e.g., About Us, PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM, http://protectmarriage.com/about (last visited July 4, 2011) 
(explaining that “Protectmarriage.com is defending traditional marriage in the courts, through activism and 
advocacy, and through public education and academic research”); Why Marriage Matters, 
PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM, http://protectmarriage.com/why-marriage-matters (last visited Feb. 28, 2012) 
(arguing that same-sex marriage should not be allowed because “[t]raditional marriage is the foundation of 
society and has served our state well for centuries”); Commonly Asked Questions, WISCONSIN COALITION 
FOR TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE, http://www.savemarriagewi.org/faq.html (last visited July 4, 2011) 
(“Traditional marriage is a bedrock institution of our communities, state, nation and society. It is not 
discriminatory. It is foundational. Protecting its historic definition for the sake of our children and our 
future is both wise and courageous . . . .”); Talking Points on Traditional Marriage, CONCERNED WOMEN 
FOR AMERICA OF KANSAS, http://states.cwfa.org/images/content/TalkingPoints.pdf (last visited July 4, 
2011) (“One of the biggest debates in our society is the conflict between those who defend traditional 
marriage and those who advocated changing the definition of marriage to include homosexual unions. . . .  
Just because you think it would be nice to let someone you know who is homosexual get married, you do 
not throw away the mainstay of our culture for thousands of years to foist a social experiment on the entire 
culture.”); see also Suzanne Goldberg, A Historical Guide to the Future of Marriage for Same-Sex 
Couples, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 249, 249 n.2 (2006) (listing various anti-same-sex marriage arguments 
that rest upon the maintenance of historical traditional marriage). 
4 Goldberg, supra note 3, at 249 n. 2; BARCLAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 214; Marriage Talking Points, 
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MARRIAGE, 
http://www.nationformarriage.org/site/c.omL2KeN0LzH/b.4475595/k.566A/Marriage_Talking_Points.htm 
(last visited July 5, 2011) (“Say we’re against ‘redefining marriage’ or in favor of ‘marriage as the union of 
husband and wife’ NEVER ‘banning same-sex marriage.’”). 
5 See KRISTIN CELELLO, MAKING MARRIAGE WORK: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN THE 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 16 (2009). 
6 Id. at 16, 126, 128, 151; NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 7, 
213–14, 219–20 (2001); Martin J. Siegel, For Better or for Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 
J. FAM. L. 45, 87 (1991). 
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Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “tradition” in relevant part as “a body of 
beliefs or stories relating to the past that are commonly accepted as historical.”7 Scholars 
discussing traditional marriage as it is understood in the United States have used a similar 
definition of the term “tradition,” focusing on the nation’s historical attitudes regarding 
marriage in identifying the requirements of traditional marriage.8 Specifically, in 
describing traditional marriage it has been noted that “[e]ven if reality has always been 
diffuse, contradictory, and complex, until a generation ago there was a social consensus 
as to what marriage meant. Marriage was permanent and monogamous; children were 
automatic, essential, and central; husbands earned money and made decisions; wives 
stayed home taking care of house, children, and husband.”9 If traditional marriage is 
defined in this manner, the requirements of traditional marriage extend beyond opposite-
sex spouses to include: (1) permanence,10 (2) gender roles,11 (3) procreation,12 and (4) 
monogamy,13 which I will refer to collectively as “the other requirements of traditional 
marriage.” 
Over the years, both U.S. society and the legal system have, in many ways, rejected 
the other requirements of traditional marriage. For example, rejection of the permanence 
                                                
7 MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 2011, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tradition (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2012).  
8 See infra note 9. 
9 Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. 
REV. 204, 207 (1982); see also Nicholas Bala, The Debates About Same-Sex Marriage in Canada and the 
United States: Controversy Over the Evolution of a Fundamental Social Institution, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 195, 
202 (2006) (“With all of these changes in the nature of ‘traditional’ marriage[—]the virtual abolition of the 
concept of illegitimacy, the discarding of legally proscribed gender roles in marriage, and the advent of ‘no 
fault’ divorce—it is understandable that the question of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships is 
arising now.”); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9 
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 89, 93 (1998) (“Traditional marriage was a lifelong commitment to an institution 
with well-defined, complementary gendered roles.”); Sherif Girgis et al., What is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL'Y 245, 246 (2011) (describing the traditional understanding of marriage as “the union of a man 
and a woman who make a permanent and exclusive commitment to each other of the type that is naturally 
(inherently) fulfilled by bearing and rearing children together”); Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, 
Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 463 (1998) 
(explaining that “traditional marriage seemed to assume that all couples . . . desired a permanent marriage 
with traditional sex roles and with procreation as a major purpose”); Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and 
the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1907–08 (2000) (“The set of norms that the 
spouses adopt and by which they agree to be bound in traditional marriage includes both commitment 
norms and gender norms, which together regulate both the spousal and the parental roles.”). 
10 See also COTT, supra note 6, at 220 (“Where public authorities a century earlier had been primed to 
defend the Christian-monogamy model from free love, interracial coupling, polygamy, self-divorce, and 
commercial sex, now the Congress found heterosexuality the crucial boundary to maintain.”); Focus on the 
Family Issue Analysts, Marriage, FOCUS ON THE FAMILY, 
http://www.focusonthefamily.com/socialissues/social-issues/marriage.aspx (last visited Feb. 29, 2012) 
(“Unfortunately, the standard of lifelong, traditional marriage as the foundation of family life in our nation 
is under attack . . . [b]attered by high rates of divorce . . . .”). 
11 See also Tiffany C. Graham, Something Old Something New: Civic Virtue and the Case for Same-Sex 
Marriage, 17 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 53, 57 (2008) (“Traditionalists who oppose same-sex marriage have 
identified . . . fundamental principles[,] [including] the role complementarity of the sexes.”). 
12 See id. (“Traditionalists who oppose same-sex marriage have identified . . . fundamental principles: 
biological procreation”). 
13 See also COTT, supra note 6, at 220. 
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requirement is demonstrated by the widespread acceptance of divorce, particularly no-
fault divorce, which allows individuals to end their marriages more quickly and easily.14 
Similarly, the rejection of traditional marital gender roles is reflected by the repeal of 
most laws that mandated or encouraged such roles and the widespread non-adherence to 
traditional gender roles among married couples.15 The repeal of the majority of laws 
providing criminal and civil penalties for adultery and the general lack of enforcement of 
the laws that do exist in this context demonstrate the rejection of the monogamy 
requirement of traditional marriage.16 Finally, the increasing number of married couples 
who choose to remain childless and the repeal of most laws that mandated or encouraged 
marital procreation demonstrate that procreation is no longer viewed as a requirement of 
marriage.17 
Though U.S. society and the legal system increasingly reject the other requirements 
of traditional marriage, many of the leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations are 
working to protect and restore these requirements. For example, leading anti-same-sex 
marriage organizations are working to limit the ability of married couples to divorce, 
reintroduce civil and criminal penalties for adultery, and promote measures that 
encourage or mandate that married men and women adhere to the gendered 
provider/dependent model of traditional marriage and procreate.18 While the voting 
public likely understands traditional marriage to mean marriage between a man and a 
woman because that is the aspect of traditional marriage stressed in anti-same-sex 
marriage campaigns, in reality traditional marriage means much more to the leading anti-
same-sex marriage organizations.  
Exposing the true meaning of traditional marriage and the efforts undertaken by the 
leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations to protect the other, widely rejected, 
requirements of traditional marriage (“the traditional marriage agenda”), would help pro-
same-sex marriage campaigns to reach a wider variety of voters and achieve greater 
success at the polls. The protection frame continues to be one of the primary frames used 
by anti-same-sex marriage campaigns due to its success in resonating with voters in the 
past.19 The protection frame has achieved such success for three main reasons: (1) by 
sending the message that marriage has always been defined as between a man and a 
woman, which happens to comport with how most people’s marriages look and how most 
unmarried individuals anticipate their future marriages will look, it sets forth a cultural 
argument that is accessible to voters; (2) it gives many voters a personal stake in the issue 
by telling them that their current or future opposite-sex marriages will be harmed by the 
legalization of same-sex marriage; and (3) same-sex marriage proponents have struggled 
to create a direct and effective response to this frame.  
Educating the public about the true meaning of traditional marriage and exposing 
the traditional marriage agenda (“the proposed strategy”), however, would provide same-
sex marriage proponents with a direct response that would dismantle this popular frame. 
                                                
14 See infra subpart II.A.1. 
15 See infra subpart II.C.1. 
16 See infra subpart II.B.1. 
17 See infra subpart II.D.1. 
18 See infra subparts II.A.2, II.B.2, II.C.2, II.D.2. 
19 See infra note 350 and accompanying text. 
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In addition, it would supply pro-same-sex marriage campaigns with their own accessible 
cultural frame—a frame that would also serve to provide voters with a greater sense of 
personal stake in voting against same-sex marriage bans.  
The proposed strategy would provide a direct and effective response to the 
protection frame by challenging whether traditional marriage is really something voters 
are interested in protecting. Specifically, the strategy challenges voters to think about 
whether they support a return to a form of marriage where the ability to leave unhappy 
marriages is taken away or severely limited, adulterous acts are criminalized, men and 
women are required to adhere to traditional gender roles, and meaningful choice 
regarding procreation is limited. It also would provide same-sex marriage proponents 
with their own accessible cultural frame by advancing the idea that the traditional 
marriage agenda is working to protect an antiquated form of marriage that society has 
widely rejected. In addition, by framing the issue as a question of whether to support or 
oppose the traditional marriage agenda, same-sex marriage proponents would provide 
significantly more voters with a personal stake in the issue. It is likely that a considerable 
number of voters who do not anticipate that they or someone close to them will want to 
enter into a same-sex marriage do not feel a strong personal stake in supporting same-sex 
marriage. However, many of these voters would feel a strong personal stake in opposing 
one or more of the other goals of the traditional marriage agenda. Specifically, there are a 
number of voters who, based on their personal interests, would be against the 
reintroduction of mandated marital permanence, monogamy, gender roles, or procreation 
and would therefore oppose an agenda that included the reintroduction of such 
requirements.20 Thus, the proposed strategy would help pro-same-sex marriage 
campaigns to persuade more voters—something that has been difficult for these 
campaigns as evidenced by the passage of anti-same-sex marriage ballot measures across 
the country.21  
The Article proposes that same-sex marriage proponents add their own traditional 
marriage frame to the same-sex marriage debate by educating voters about the true 
meaning of traditional marriage, exposing the traditional marriage agenda, and urging 
voters to consider whether traditional marriage is really something they would like to 
support. Part II considers the legal and cultural histories of the other traditional marriage 
requirements within the United States. It also identifies and explores recent efforts by 
leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations to further these other requirements of 
traditional marriage. Part III discusses the relevant tactics employed by each side of the 
same-sex marriage debate in framing the issue. It then sets forth the argument that 
undertaking the proposed strategy would positively affect pro-same-sex marriage 
campaigns for a variety of interrelated reasons. Finally, Part IV identifies and examines 
the likely classes of voters who would feel a strong personal stake in opposing the 
traditional marriage agenda if it was exposed and offers a number of ideas regarding the 
implementation of the proposed strategy with regard to the specific wording of the 
message that is ultimately advanced to the voting public. 
                                                
20 See infra Part IV. 
21 See infra note 339 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE AND THE 
MORE RECENT EFFORTS OF THE LEADING ANTI-SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ORGANIZATIONS TO 
PROTECT SUCH REQUIREMENTS 
To fully understand the meaning of traditional marriage, it is necessary to review 
how U.S. society and the legal system have, over the years, treated the other requirements 
of traditional marriage—permanence, monogamy, gender roles, and procreation. In the 
early years of the United States the legal system often aided in reinforcing the historical 
requirements of traditional marriage, reflecting society’s views regarding the value of 
such requirements.22 Over the years, however, both U.S. society and the legal system 
have come to largely reject the other requirements of traditional marriage. Although 
today most aspects of the other requirements of traditional marriage have been rejected 
by the U.S. public and removed from the law, many of the leading anti-same-sex 
marriage organizations continue their efforts to maintain or reintroduce such 
requirements. 
A. Permanence 
1. The History of the Permanence Requirement of Traditional Marriage 
Permanence as a core requirement of traditional marriage within the United States 
is reflected in the earliest U.S. laws and societal beliefs. During colonial times, the 
Southern colonies generally did not have provisions for judicial divorce, keeping in line 
with England’s rejection of the practice.23 In New England, however, courts and 
legislatures occasionally granted divorces.24 Following the Revolutionary War, more 
states began to permit judicial divorces.25 While it was more difficult to obtain a divorce 
in some states than in others, all of the states that permitted divorce had strict rules 
regarding the circumstances under which a divorce could be obtained.26 For example, in 
New York, one of the stricter states, divorce was granted only on the grounds of 
adultery.27 California, on the other hand, allowed for divorce on myriad grounds 
including adultery, abandonment, neglect, intemperance, felony conviction, and extreme 
cruelty.28 Most states adopted more moderate laws, identifying adultery and a few other 
grounds for divorce.29 Divorce rates steadily increased during the first half of the 
nineteenth century.30 As a result, divorce became an increasingly controversial issue.31 
                                                
22 See Shultz, supra note 9, at 207. 
23 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 204 (1985); MARY JONES, AN HISTORICAL 
GEOGRAPHY OF CHANGING DIVORCE LAW IN THE U.S. 18 (1987) (“The Southern colonies, dominated as 
they were by the Church of England, did not allow absolute divorce for any reason.”). 
24 FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 204. 
25 Joanna L. Grossman, Fear and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage and Some Lessons from 
the History of Marriage and Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 87, 89 (2004). 




30 JONES, supra note 23, at 20, 26–27. 
31 Id. 
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Opponents of liberal divorce laws argued that such laws endangered the sanctity of 
marriage.32 In contrast, proponents argued that liberal divorce laws were fundamental to 
the maintenance of a free society and were necessary to protect women from abusive 
husbands and to give women some control in an otherwise patriarchal institution.33 In the 
1850s, “divorce became a rallying point for social critics who saw the rate as irrefutable 
evidence of creeping moral decay in the United States.”34 In response to these criticisms, 
during the 1870s and 1880s many state legislatures adopted more stringent divorce 
laws.35 
As the country grew, divorce rates continued to increase, and areas settled in the 
first half of the twentieth century established more expansive divorce laws.36 Additional 
grounds for divorce such as non-support, insanity, voluntary separation, and 
incompatibility were promulgated in many areas, and the number of uncontested divorces 
grew.37 In 1950, in an effort to combat increasing divorce rates, a few states established 
mandatory pre-divorce marital counseling programs.38 These programs were quickly 
abolished, however, due in part to low success rates.39 Opponents of divorce at this time 
viewed divorce as an evil that, if allowed, would result in the destruction of the institution 
of marriage.40 Opponents also feared that the widespread availability of divorce would 
lead to, among other things, women’s rejection of traditional gender roles, thereby further 
dismantling the institution of marriage.41 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, Americans became increasingly unhappy 
with fault-based divorce laws.42 As opposed to the earlier widely held view that 
permanence was a core requirement of marriage, “[t]he emerging view was one of 
marriage as a partnership between two individuals which was terminable at the will of 
those involved when the marriage failed to meet the needs of either party.”43 Fault-based 
divorce laws produced a number of undesirable effects. These laws often resulted in 
costly and humiliating litigation aimed at proving one party was at “fault” so that the 
divorce could occur.44 Where none of the specified grounds existed, couples had to stay 
legally married or fraudulently claim that one of the parties had committed an act that 
qualified to put that party at fault.45 Fault-based divorce laws were also criticized for 
oppressing women by encouraging traditional gender roles and making it difficult for 
                                                
32 CELELLO, supra note 5, at 18. 
33 Id. at 20; JONES, supra note 23, at 27. 
34 CELELLO, supra note 5, at 19. 
35 Id. 
36 Kathleen A. Portuan Miller, Who Says Muslim Women Don’t Have the Right to Divorce?—A 
Comparison Between Anglo-American Law and Islamic Law, 22 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 201, 205 (2009). 
37 Id. 
38 Matthew J. Astle, An Ounce of Prevention: Marital Counseling Laws as an Anti-Divorce Measure, 38 
FAM. L.Q. 733, 739 (2004). 
39 Id. 
40 CELELLO, supra note 5, at 85. 
41 Id. 
42 Portuan Miller, supra note 36, at 205.  
43 Nicole D. Lindsey, Marriage and Divorce: Degrees of “I Do,” An Analysis of the Ever-Changing 
Paradigm of Divorce, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 265, 267 (1998). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
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women to leave unhealthy marriages.46 For example, a wife’s failure to conform to 
traditional gender roles by neglecting her household duties could establish grounds for 
divorce, while “a husband's behavior would not rise to the level of divorce-inducing 
misconduct unless he repeatedly abused his wife physically (one violent incident 
generally was not enough) or completely abandoned her financially.”47  
In 1969, California became the first state to adopt “no-fault divorce,” meaning 
there was no longer any legal requirement that an individual or couple seeking a divorce 
prove that one party was at fault.48 The no-fault movement quickly gained traction, and 
between 1969 and 1985 almost every state incorporated some form of no-fault divorce.49 
Overall, it is believed that the widespread acceptance of no-fault divorce resulted from 
society’s changing view of the role of women, increasing acceptance of non-marital sex 
and children born out of wedlock, “dissatisfaction with the cost of fault divorce,” the 
decreased role of religion in defining marriage, and “growing recognition of marriage as 
a partnership.” 50 
Between 1970 and 1990, the divorce rate in the United States increased by thirty-
four percent.51 The no-fault divorce movement “revealed more profoundly that increasing 
numbers of people did not treat marriage as an agreement for life.”52 As a result, 
opponents of no-fault divorce restated their claim that such laws were destroying the 
institution of marriage.53  
During the 1990s, with around forty percent of all marriages ending in divorce,54 a 
strong anti-divorce movement fueled by social conservatives began.55 The most dramatic 
attempts to protect traditional marriage from divorce and maintain permanency as a core 
aspect of marriage involved the creation of an alternative form of marriage called 
“covenant marriage.”56 Covenant marriage laws, seen as “a revolutionary attempt to 
strengthen marriage,” provide for an enhanced level of marital commitment.57 In the 
states that have enacted covenant marriage laws, couples have the opportunity to choose 
between entering a covenant marriage and a standard marriage.58 Covenant marriage laws 
                                                
46 Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (1989). 
47 Id. at 1110, 1111.  
48 Lindsey, supra note 43, at 267. 
49 Id.  
50 Chauncey E. Brummer, The Shackles of Covenant Marriage: Who Holds the Keys to Wedlock?, 25 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 261, 271 (2003). 
51 Lindsey, supra note 43, at 269. 
52 Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 
275, 314 (1992).  
53 See Astle, supra note 38, at 735; Kimberly Diane White, Note, Covenant Marriage: An Unnecessary 
Second Attempt at Fault-Based Divorce, 61 ALA. L. REV. 869, 871 (2010). 
54 Divorce Statistics Collection, Divorce Rates, AMERICANS FOR DIVORCE REFORM,  
http://www.divorcereform.org/rates.html (last visited July 4, 2011). 
55 See Astle, supra note 38, at 739; CELELLO, supra note 5, at 151. 
56 See Astle, supra note 38, at 735–39. 
57 Id. at 735–36. 
58 Katherine Shaw Spaht, Covenant Marriage: An Achievable Legal Response to the Inherent Nature of 
Marriage and Its Various Goods, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 467, 468 (“As a legal response to the social costs 
levied by the streamlined divorce system, three states have adopted covenant-marriage statutes that offer 
couples an optional—and I argue preferable—form of marriage.”). 
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share three major requirements.59 First, they limit the grounds for divorce and reintroduce 
the concept of fault.60 Divorce may be granted upon request only if one of the traditional 
fault-based grounds exists, such as adultery, imprisonment, abandonment, or physical or 
sexual abuse (only the Arizona covenant marriage law includes emotional abuse as a 
ground for divorce).61 If none of the fault-based grounds exist, a couple is not allowed to 
divorce until a significant period of time has passed, usually at least one or two years, 
although in Arizona a divorce may be granted without satisfying a waiting period when 
both spouses agree to dissolution of the marriage.62 Second, covenant marriage laws 
require couples to undergo premarital counseling,63 and in Arkansas, pre-divorce 
counseling is also required.64 Third, before a marriage license is issued, the couple must 
sign a declaration of intent stating that they will do everything in their power to save their 
marriage before seeking a divorce.65 
At the height of the anti-divorce movement in 1997 and 1998, over one-third of the 
states introduced covenant marriage bills.66 To date, however, only three states, Arizona, 
Louisiana, and Arkansas, have actually passed covenant marriage laws.67 The widespread 
rejection of such laws is notable, as “[r]emarkably, the failure of covenant marriage bills 
to pass has occurred even though the legislation simply offers a couple an alternative to 
the prevailing legal regime of ‘no-fault divorce’ marriage.”68 While most states have 
rejected covenant marriage laws and every state has now implemented some form of no-
fault divorce,69 over the years a number of states,70 aiming for less drastic measures, have 
adopted mandatory pre-divorce counseling.71 In addition, the majority of states now 
require some type of mandatory waiting period in the context of no-fault divorces.72 
Today, the divorce rate remains at forty percent, similar to what it has been over the past 
                                                
59 Astle, supra note 38, at 736. 
60 Id. 
61 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25–903 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9–
11–808 (2011). 
62 See supra note 61. 
63 See supra note 61. 
64 Brummer, supra note 50, at 282. 
65 Astle, supra note 38, at 736 
66 Id. at 737. 
67 Id. at 735. 
68 Katherine Shaw Spaht, Covenant Marriage Seven Years Later: Its as Yet Unfulfilled Promise, 65 LA. L. 
REV. 605, 605 (2005). 
69 Karen Rubin, New York State Implements 'No-Fault' Divorce, Mandates Interim Spousal Support, 
EXAMINER.COM (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/populist-in-long-island/new-york-state-
implements-no-fault-divorce-mandates-interim-spousal-support. A number of jurisdictions, however, allow 
fault to be a consideration in the judicial determination of alimony, spousal support, or property division 
even in the context of no-fault divorces. Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Fault as Consideration in 
Alimony, Spousal Support, or Property Division Awards Pursuant to No-Fault Divorce, 86 A.L.R.3d 1116 
(2010).  
70 Astle, supra note 38, at 739. 
71 Astle, supra note 38, at 739. 
72 DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 443 (2d ed. 2009); see also NATIONAL 
SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 396–411 (Richard E. Leiter ed., 6th ed. 2008). Among U.S. jurisdictions, the 
statutory durational requirement that the couple live “separate and apart” from one another ranges from six 
months to three years. See id. 
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two decades.73 In the three states that have enacted covenant marriage laws, the number 
of couples who have chosen covenant marriages has been extremely low—it is estimated 
that only one to two percent of couples who have married in those states chose covenant 
marriages.74 
Covenant marriage laws and laws that mandate lengthy waiting periods have been 
widely opposed and criticized on numerous grounds. Critics have argued that covenant 
marriage “involves unconstitutional state support of religion, entails too much state 
involvement in marriage, infringes on the right to marry, and is harmful to women and 
children.”75 Opponents of covenant marriage posit that the limits on the grounds for 
divorce and lengthy mandatory waiting periods seriously harm spouses and children 
involved in unhealthy marriages.76 In addition, since the rules surrounding covenant 
marriage make exiting the marriage more difficult, costly, and time-consuming than 
exiting a standard marriage,77 spouses who lack sufficient resources (and thus are the 
most vulnerable) and their children might be unable to leave unhealthy marriages.78 Other 
critics cite the harms of reintroducing the often-humiliating litigation necessary for 
proving fault and the incentives for couples to perjure themselves or manufacture fault in 
order to leave the marriage.79 Similarly, critics have also set forth the argument that the 
lengthy litigation that will be necessary in many cases for dissolving a covenant marriage 
will have a “negative impact on miring our already crowded courts in lengthy, messy, and 
acrimonious divorces.”80 
Premarital and pre-divorce counseling requirements have also been criticized on 
several grounds. In addition to the argument that the government requiring marital 
counseling for couples who do not wish to undergo such counseling is an unconstitutional 
infringement on individual liberties,81 some critics point out that requiring couples to 
undergo counseling has proven ineffective at preventing divorce in the past.82 Moreover, 
with regard to pre-divorce counseling requirements, forcing individuals involved in 
                                                
73 Lindsey, supra note 43, at 269; Michelle L. Evans, Wrongs Committed During a Marriage: The Child 
that No Area of the Law Wants to Adopt, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465, 466 (2009) (“[I]t is estimated that 
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DIVORCE REFORM, http://www.divorcereform.org/rates.html (last visited July 4, 2011) (listing divorce rates 
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74 See Steven L. Nock et al., Covenant Marriage Turns Five Years Old, 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 169, 170 
(2003); Rick Lyman, Trying to Strengthen an “I Do” with a More Binding Legal Tie, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 
2005, at A1. 
75 Issues and Controversies, Covenant Marriage, FACTS ON FILE NEWS SERVICES (May 7, 1999), 
http://2facts.es.vrc.scoolaid.net/icof_story.aspx?PIN=i0401120.  
76 White, supra note 53, at 871, 877. 
77 Daniel W. Olivas, Tennessee Considers Adopting the Louisiana Covenant Marriage Act: A Law Waiting 
to Be Ignored, 71 TENN. L. REV. 769, 770 (2004). 
78 Id. at 792–93. 
79 See id. at 793–94. 
80 Stephanie Mansur, Covenant Marriage: Divorce Reform Louisiana-Style, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY 
POLICY COUNSEL 3 (1998), 
http://www.ncfpc.org/PolicyPapers/Findings%209808%20Covenant%20Marr.pdf. 
81 Astle, supra note 38, at 743. 
82 FACTS ON FILE NEWS SERVICES, supra note 75; Astle, supra note 38, at 739. 
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abusive or unhealthy marital situations to have continuing contact with their spouses 
through required counseling can pose a significant danger.83 
Many women’s rights supporters, in particular, have strongly opposed covenant 
marriage laws and laws that require mandatory pre-divorce waiting periods or 
counseling.84 Notably, in opposite-sex marriages, it is the woman who initiates divorce 
two-thirds of the time.85 With the fault requirements of covenant marriage laws, the party 
seeking a divorce is encouraged to paint him- or herself as the victim—a position that 
society has historically encouraged women to fill.86 Opponents contend that “[t]hrough its 
paternalistic assumption that the state must save women from men, ‘covenant marriage 
laws are anti-feminist in their conception and application. Indeed, they are infantilizing to 
women and cast them into a place of perpetual subordination.’”87 Citing the limited 
grounds available for divorce, opponents of covenant marriage have also argued “that the 
[covenant marriage] system reinforces patriarchal marriage by limiting women’s ability 
to leave marriages with power imbalances.”88 Moreover, since it is women and children 
more often than men who are the victims of abuse in the home, limited grounds for 
obtaining divorce, mandatory waiting periods, and mandatory pre-divorce counseling 
requirements disproportionately harm women who wish to leave harmful marital 
situations.89 This is because even though physical and sexual abuse are grounds for 
divorce under the covenant marriage laws, proving such abuse can be very difficult, time-
consuming, and costly,90 and emotional abuse is not a recognized ground for divorce 
under two of the three existing state covenant marriage laws.91 
2. Recent Efforts by Same-Sex Marriage Opponents to Protect the Permanence 
Requirement of Traditional Marriage 
Many of today’s leading same-sex marriage opponents have also been at the 
forefront of the movement to protect the permanence requirement of traditional marriage, 
attempting to severely restrict the ability of individuals to leave marriages in which they 
no longer wish to exist.92 For example, Maggie Gallagher, co-founder of the National 
Organization for Marriage and president of the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy,93 
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84 See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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89 See White, supra note 53, at 877. 
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91 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
92 CELELLO, supra note 5, at 151. 
93 About NOM, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MARRIAGE, 
http://www.nationformarriage.org/site/c.omL2KeN0LzH/b.3479573/k.E2D0/About_NOM.htm (last visited 
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two organizations that have long led the charge to ban same-sex marriage, has undertaken 
significant efforts to protect the permanence requirement of traditional marriage.94 The 
Institute for Marriage and Public Policy counts divorce law reform as one of its most 
important issues.95 The Institute has been a strong supporter and promoter of covenant 
marriage laws and, in fact, has model covenant marriage legislation available on its 
website.96 In addition to its strong support for covenant marriage legislation, the Institute 
also seeks to restore marital permanence by changing current laws to make divorce more 
difficult. In its “Statement of Principles,” for example, the Institute calls for one- or two-
year waiting periods for unilaterally sought divorces and the introduction of legal 
requirements that couples who wish to divorce “show ‘good faith’ efforts or ‘due 
diligence’ to save their marriages by taking responsible steps to reconcile.”97 
Similarly, the Family Research Council, another leading organization in the 
movement to ban same-sex marriage,98 has since its inception worked to protect the 
permanence requirement of traditional marriage by making the divorce process more 
difficult throughout the United States.99 The Family Research Council has “consistently 
called for the repeal of no-fault divorce laws in all 50 states”100 and works to promote 
legislation requiring the mutual consent of both spouses before a divorce is granted.101 
The organization also advocates for longer pre-divorce waiting periods.102 The Family 
Research Council has also been a strong supporter of covenant marriage laws and has 
worked to have them passed across the United States.103 In fact it was Family Research 
Council President Tony Perkins, a former Louisiana State Representative, who 
introduced the Louisiana covenant marriage legislation.104 Initially, Perkins, “after 
consulting with [a group of pastors in his district] . . . drafted a bill that only allowed for 
divorce in what they saw as the biblically licit cases of adultery and abandonment.”105 A 
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95 Divorce Law Reform, INSTITUTE FOR MARRIAGE AND POLICY, http://www.marriagedebate.com/dlr.php 
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few additional grounds for divorce, such as physical and sexual abuse, were added during 
the subsequent legislative process.106 
A number of the other leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations also undertake 
significant efforts to protect the permanence requirement of traditional marriage by 
restricting an individual’s freedom to end his or her marriage. For example, leading anti-
same-sex marriage organizations Focus on the Family, the American Family Association, 
Concerned Women for America, and Liberty Counsel all work to end no-fault divorce 
and reintroduce fault-based divorce laws.107 Focus on the Family also supports legislation 
requiring parents seeking a divorce to undergo education regarding the effects of divorce 
on children and legislation requiring both spouses to consent before a divorce can be 
granted.108 The Massachusetts Family Institute, another leader of the anti-same-sex 
marriage movement, has proposed legislation requiring couples to undergo pre-divorce 
counseling and lengthy waiting periods.109 Thus, a close look into the other activities of 
the organizations leading the movement to ban same-sex marriage makes it clear that 
many of these organizations also continue to undertake serious efforts to maintain the 
permanence requirement of traditional marriage by severely limiting the ability of people 
to end marriages in which they no longer wish to exist. 
B. Gender Roles  
1. The History of the Gender Roles Requirement of Traditional Marriage 
Early laws in the United States reflected the gender roles requirement of traditional 
marriage. The law of coverture, derived from English common law, set forth the rights of 
married women in the American colonies.110 The law of coverture mandated that upon 
marriage, a husband and wife became one legally recognized person—the husband.111 
The wife had no independent legal existence.112 “The very being or legal existence of the 
woman [was] suspended during the marriage, or at least incorporated or consolidated into 
                                                
106 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=18237&department=FIELD&categoryid (Concerned Women 
for America); Eartha Jane Melzer, McManus Pushes to End ‘No Fault’ Divorce, MICH. MESSENGER (Feb. 
22, 2010, 7:02 AM) http://michiganmessenger.com/35028/mcmanus-pushes-to-end-no-fault-divorce 
(American Family Association); Mathew D. Staver, Preserving Marriage, LIBERTY COUNSEL, 
http://www.lc.org/media/9980/attachments/preservingmarriage.html (last visited July 4, 2011) (Liberty 
Counsel); Bernard A. Drew, What God Hath Joined Together: No-Fault Divorce Laws Challenged in 
Michigan, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE,  http://www.publiceye.org/ifas/fw/9607/divorce.html (last visited 
March 22, 2012) (Focus on the Family). 
108 Focus on the Family Issue Analysts, Our Position (Marriage), FOCUS ON THE FAMILY, 
http://www.focusonthefamily.com/socialissues/marriage-and-family/marriage/our-position.aspx (last 
visited July 4, 2011). 
109 Glen Johnson, Report Focuses on Fatherlessness, SOUTHCOASTTODAY.COM (June 13, 1997, 12:00 AM) 
http://www.southcoasttoday.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/19970613/NEWS/306139961&emailAFriend
=1. 
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that of the husband.”113 In other words, a wife’s legal identity ceased to exist and literally 
became covered by that of her husband upon marriage.114 
Under the law of coverture, a husband had exclusive control over the property his 
wife brought into the marriage as well as any property she acquired during the 
marriage.115 The husband was legally responsible for providing for his wife and family, 
while the wife was “obligated to give all her service and labor to her husband.”116 
Married women could not execute contracts, bring lawsuits, or convey property.117 In 
addition, married women were not allowed to serve as legal guardians, administrators, or 
executors of estates.118 The husband alone had control over the couple’s finances.119 He 
also controlled the custody of the children.120 There was no legal remedy for a wife who 
had been forced by her husband to have sexual relations, as “a husband could not rape his 
wife because she, as his ‘property,’ had consented to sex with him as a function of their 
marriage.”121 In sum, a wife’s personal and real property, as well as her person, belonged 
to her husband.122 
The law of coverture remained widespread until the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, when, during the Industrial Revolution, “the preeminence of commerce and the 
stable transition of wealth became highly desirable social values.”123 To further these 
values, Married Women’s Property Acts were passed in every state, generally granting 
married women the ability to own and convey property, contract, engage in litigation, 
join the workforce, and control personal finances, among other things.124  
As the twentieth century began, although married women began to be considered 
independent legal persons, society still viewed husbands and wives as operating in 
separate spheres.125 Women were responsible for the children and household, operating 
within the private sphere of the home, while men were responsible for all outside 
relationships and public activities.126 The legal system reflected and reinforced these 
norms.127 Although women were allowed to earn and keep their wages, they were 
typically only hired for certain types of low-paying jobs and were not protected from 
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wage or employment discrimination.128 Thus, if it was necessary for one person in the 
marital unit to stay home, it generally made greater sense for it to be the wife.129 
By 1930, only twelve percent of wives were in the labor force,130 and the courts 
“jealously guarded the right of the husband to the wife’s services in the household as part 
of the legal definition of marriage.”131 New Deal legislation, which sought to remedy the 
economic ills of the period, “assumed the male earner to be primary and granted 
entitlements of social or economic citizenship to women as their loyal dependents.”132 
Although women increasingly entered the workforce in the 1940s, this movement was 
largely born out of necessity due to the large-scale involvement of men in World War 
II.133 When the war ended, Congress passed laws that worked to further the reinstitution 
of traditional gender roles.134 For example, the GI Bill, passed in 1944, provided veterans 
(ninety-eight percent of whom were male) with higher education and job training 
opportunities, pensions, loans, mortgage funds, and preference for civil service jobs.135  
During the 1950s and the early 1960s, as many married women left their jobs in 
wartime industries, society and the legal system alike seemed to maintain the early view 
that a married woman’s primary role was caretaker of her husband, children, and 
home.136 To this end, in many states only husbands could bring loss of consortium claims 
because, in the view of the law, it was only husbands who lost their spouses’ domestic 
and caretaking services in the event of death.137 Further, women generally still could only 
secure certain types of low-wage work, and tax incentives encouraged couples to remain 
in the traditional gendered provider/dependent model of marriage.138  
Beginning in the mid- to late-1960s, however, attitudes began to shift. The 
women’s rights movement gained significant traction, “deeply inflecting the trends in 
work and family life.”139 Women’s rights activists began to publicly criticize traditional 
marriage and to demand “equal rights and equal access in the public sphere.”140 Public 
awareness about sex discrimination was raised, and the concept of sexism became part of 
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the public discourse.141 The term “sexual politics” also came to fruition, expressing “the 
new sensitivity to power asymmetries between men and women, husbands and wives.”142 
Such consciousness-raising efforts helped convince many married and unmarried women 
that their subordination was not the product of personal failings but rather the result of a 
system based upon sexual inequality.143  
Feminists decried the devaluation of wives’ unpaid household work and protested 
oppressing and “demeaning women by confining their talents to housekeeping, 
childminding, and personal services to men.”144 Some feminists analogized wives to 
slaves, pointing out that wives did not receive pay for their work within the home, were 
denied freedom of movement, and lacked control over their own bodies.145 As the public 
became more attuned to the harms presented by adherence to traditional marital gender 
roles, “[r]emaining legal constraints on wives in the business world unraveled.”146 
Federal laws prohibiting employment and wage discrimination based upon sex, such as 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, came into 
existence, making it more feasible for married women to reject traditional gender roles 
and join the workforce.147 With this legislation, “[t]he massive shift in the official view of 
women workers toward equality and individual rights was well under way.”148  
In the 1970s, opposition to traditional gender roles continued to increase, providing 
women with greater ability to choose not to adhere to traditional gender roles within their 
marriages. In 1972, Title IX of the Higher Education Amendments was passed, 
prohibiting educational programs receiving federal funding from discriminating on the 
basis of sex and advancing women’s educational opportunities. By 1981 the majority of 
students enrolled in higher education programs were female.149 In addition, during the 
1970s, eighteen states (in addition to the three states that had already done so) amended 
their constitutions to prohibit the denial of equal rights on the basis of sex.150 Then, in 
1976, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to require a higher degree of scrutiny than that previously 
imposed for sex-based classifications, and lawsuits succeeded in dismantling sex-based 
distinctions across many areas of the law such as employment, education, jury service, 
social security, and military benefits.151 In 1978, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act was 
passed, amending Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in all 
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aspects of employment and providing many married and unmarried women with more 
protection in the workforce.152  
The Supreme Court itself acknowledged the demise of traditional marital gender 
roles during the 1970s, stating that “[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home 
and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of 
ideas.”153 Moreover, with the advent of no-fault divorce, women gained greater control 
over their marital situations and became more empowered to leave marriages with power 
imbalances.154 In addition, while child custody had traditionally been awarded to the wife 
upon divorce, states revised their laws so that joint custody and child support obligations 
for both parents became the default.155 Divorce reforms such as this “intended to see the 
roles of both husband and wife more gender-neutrally, with both able to be earners and 
caring parents.”156  
These changes, however, did not come without significant backlash from certain 
groups. With the rising frequency of divorce and the strengthening of the women’s rights 
movement, including the increasing legal protection for women from education, 
employment, and wage discrimination, “a burgeoning group of social conservatives . . . 
argued that only a return to ‘traditional’ pre-feminist marital roles could save American 
marriage.”157 The New Right, explicitly intent on protecting the traditional family unit 
through the maintenance of traditional gender roles, successfully blocked the ratification 
of the federal Equal Rights Amendment (a proposed amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibiting the denial of equal rights on the basis of sex).158  
Despite the efforts of the New Right, however, the visibility of women in the 
workforce grew significantly in the 1980s.159 More women landed positions in the 
higher-paying careers traditionally reserved for men.160 In 1989, the Supreme Court 
granted greater protections to women in the workforce, expanding previous 
interpretations of Title VII and concluding that it protected women from discrimination 
based upon sex stereotyping.161 In addition, states began to eliminate the final remaining 
legal feature of coverture, the marital rape exemption, with all states eradicating laws 
providing a full exemption for spousal rape by the early 1990s.162 This reflected society’s 
rejection of the legal notion that a husband had control over his wife’s body and 
“announced a new norm of the wife’s self-possession, with the potential to reframe the 
roles of both marriage partners.”163  
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In the early 1990s, social conservatives renewed their criticisms of American 
marriage.164 “One of the foundations of the conservative stance on the family was a 
defense of ‘traditional’ marriage, characterized by clearly defined gender roles.”165 
Conservatives maintained that the career goals of wives, and especially mothers, should 
consist primarily of caring for their families.166 Nevertheless, the legal system and society 
continued to move toward full recognition of equal rights for women and the eradication 
of traditional marital gender roles.  
For example, legislation such as the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 
(FMLA) was passed “to address gender inequities in employment and maintenance of the 
family in contemporary society.”167 The FMLA is gender neutral and requires qualifying 
employers to grant up to twelve weeks of leave within a twelve-month period for the 
birth or adoption of a child or the employee’s caretaking of a child, spouse, or parent.168 
When the employee returns post-leave, the employer is required to place the employee in 
the same or an equivalent position to the one held pre-leave, with the same benefits and 
pay.169 The FMLA makes it easier for both men and women to reject traditional marital 
gender roles by giving both husbands and wives the ability to undertake caretaking 
functions without sacrificing their careers.  
In 1993, around twenty-two percent of wives earned more than their husbands.170 
By 2007, this number had risen to thirty-three percent, as legal advancements such as the 
FMLA made it easier for women to achieve and maintain positions with higher earning 
potential.171 Rejecting their traditional marital gender roles as dependents and 
homemakers, over sixty percent of married women who lived with their husbands worked 
outside the home in 1998.172 Moreover, in the late 1990s research indicated that husbands 
were taking on more housework and childcare responsibilities than at any previous time 
in the country’s history.173 As of 2009, women constituted approximately forty-seven 
percent of the workforce.174 In addition, in every year since 1981 more women than men 
have enrolled in higher education programs, and as of 2010 women accounted for fifty-
seven percent of all college enrollments.175 In 2010, the traditional marital situation—in 
which the husband was employed and the wife did not work outside the home—existed in 
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172 Ben Wattenberg, The First Measured Century, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/fmc/book/2work8.htm (last 
visited July 5, 2011). 
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only nineteen percent of marriages.176 Today, while a few remaining laws in areas such as 
welfare, social security benefits, and income tax still encourage the traditional/dependent 
marital model in certain situations,177 laws that overtly mandate traditional marital gender 
roles have become obsolete.178  
2. Recent Efforts by Same-Sex Marriage Opponents to Protect the Gender Roles 
Requirement of Traditional Marriage 
Many of the leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations also work to reinstate 
the gender roles requirement of traditional marriage. Maggie Gallagher, president of two 
of the leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations,179 explicitly seeks to “renew a 
woman’s status as wife,” claiming that “[i]n spite of the sexual revolution, the outlines of 
the identity men assume in becoming husbands remain clear: husbands are men who have 
sworn to protect and provide for their wives and children.”180 The Family Research 
Council supports controversial welfare law provisions that further traditional gender roles 
by encouraging low-income women to marry and depend upon their husbands for 
financial support.181 
Another leading anti-same-sex marriage organization, Concerned Women for 
America, continues to fight the adoption of equal rights amendments to state 
constitutions.182 Concerned Women for America opposes equal rights amendments 
because, among other things, such amendments would require states to provide women 
with equal pay for equal work and “would pave the way for state subsidized daycare for 
                                                
176 Families by Presence and Relationship of Employed Members and Family Type, 2009–10 Annual 
Averages, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/famee.t02.htm (last visited July 5, 2011). 
177 COTT, supra note 6, at 223. 
178 Deborah A. Widiss, Reconfiguring Sex, Gender, and the Law of Marriage 31 (Sept. 2010) (working 
paper), available at 
https://www.law.indiana.edu/centers/lawsociety/documents/Sex_Gender_and_Marriage.pdf (“The law of 
marriage is already sex neutral.”); see also MCBRIDE-STETSON, supra note 148, at 225 (“Nevertheless, 
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are some state laws on the books, however, that encourage traditional gender roles. For example, there are 
state laws that assume the domicile of the family is that of husband, penalize the husband only for 
abandonment, desertion, and nonsupport, and allow only husbands to sue for loss of consortium claims. Id. 
at 196–201. 
179 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
180 Maggie Gallagher, If Marriage Is Natural, Why Is Defending It So Hard? Taking Up the Challenge to 
Marriage in the Pews and in the Public Square, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 409, 428 (2006). 
181 Patrick F. Fagan, Perception Correction for Congress: New Study Indicates Poor Parents Want to 
Marry, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL (Oct. 23 2001), http://www.frc.org/pat-fagan/perception-correction-
for-congress. For discussion of these controversial provisions, see Gwendolyn Mink, Violating Women: 
Rights Abuses in the Welfare Police State, 577 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 79, 80 (2001); Jyl 
Josephson, Coercive Visibility: Gender Deviance, TANF Reauthorization, and State Control of Low-
Income Women and Men 4 (unpublished manuscript), (2003), available at 
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/6/2/1/8/pages62189/p62189-1.php; 
Deborah A. Widiss et al., Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. 
J.L. & GENDER 461, 461 (2007). 
182 The “Equal Rights” Amendment, FAM. CONCERNS (Concerned Women for Am. of Kan., Shawnee 
Mission, Kan), Dec. 18, 2008, available at http://www.cwfa.org/images/content/fc2008-21.pdf. 
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children.”183 Taking these concerns together, it becomes clear that Concerned Women for 
America fears that equal rights amendments would lead to the displacement of gender 
roles by providing incentives and making it easier for married and unmarried women to 
work instead of staying home with their children. The organization clearly sets forth its 
position on maintaining traditional marital gender roles on its website, wherein married 
women are explicitly urged to stay home with their children and prioritize caretaking 
over their professional goals.184  
Other leaders of notable anti-same-sex marriage organizations, such as Gary Bauer, 
former president of the Family Research Council and current president of American 
Values, and Paul Weyrich, founder of the Heritage Foundation, are signatories185 to a 
manifesto seeking to restore the “natural family.”186 The manifesto seeks to end what it 
describes as the “aggressive state promotion of androgyny.”187 Although the manifesto 
states that “nothing in our platform would prevent women from seeking and attaining as 
much education as they want,” it decries the imposition of the “full gender equality” that 
“destroyed family wage systems” and seeks to reinstate a “family wage for fathers.”188 It 
describes the “family wage” as a system “through which the industrial sector could claim 
only one adult per family, the father, who in turn had the natural right to a living wage 
that would also sustain a mother and children at home in decency.”189 The manifesto 
contends that women should become “wives, homemakers, and mothers,” and men 
should become “husbands, homebuilders, and fathers,” and promotes “husbandry” and 
“housewifery.”190  
Focus on the Family seeks to maintain the gender roles requirement of traditional 
marriage in a slightly different manner. Focus on the Family has a section of its website 
dedicated to teaching parents about how to raise a boy who is not a “sissy” and a girl who 
is not a “tomboy.”191 It instructs, for example, that it is the father’s job to “pull the boy 
toward masculine play and interests” and “gender-aligned behavior.”192 In order to pull 
the children away from non-gender-aligned behavior, the parents must perform in 
accordance with their traditional marital gender roles.193 
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Indeed, opponents of same-sex marriage often cite the maintenance of traditional 
marital gender roles as a primary reason for their opposition to same-sex marriage, as 
same-sex couples by definition would not be able to fulfill traditional marital gender 
roles.194 The Family Research Council, for example, in opposing same-sex marriage 
states that: 
If same-sex civil marriage is institutionalized, our society would take yet 
another step down the road of de-gendering marriage. There would be 
more use of gender-neutral language like "partners" and—more 
importantly—more social and cultural pressures to neuter our thinking and 
our behaviors in marriage. But marriages typically thrive when spouses 
specialize in gender-typical ways and are attentive to the gendered needs 
and aspirations of their husband or wife. For instance, women are happier 
when their husband earns the lion's share of the household income. 
Likewise, couples are less likely to divorce when the wife concentrates on 
childrearing and the husband concentrates on breadwinning.195 
Likewise, Liberty Counsel opposes same-sex marriage on the grounds that it would 
“make gender roles irrelevant.”196 Overall, many of the leading opponents of same-sex 
marriage also are working to protect the gender roles requirement of traditional marriage. 
C. Procreation 
1. The History of the Procreation Requirement of Traditional Marriage 
During the early years of the United States, society viewed procreation as a core 
requirement of marriage, and the legal system reflected this view.197 Historically, the 
most explicit laws in this context were those that banned the use of contraceptives by 
married couples,198 prohibited sexual acts that could not result in procreation (“sodomy 
laws”), and prohibited sexual intercourse outside of marriage (“fornication laws”). In 
conjunction, these laws were used to maintain procreation as a requirement of traditional 
marriage. Laws such as these expressed the sentiment that the state had a strong interest 
in procreation as a fundamental aspect of marriage199 and worked together to significantly 
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limit the meaningful choice of married couples (as well as unmarried couples) with 
regard to their child-bearing decisions.  
In terms of the laws banning contraception, the Comstock Laws, which defined 
contraceptives as obscene and criminalized their dissemination through the mail or across 
states lines,200 were “the first of [their] kind in the Western world.”201 The federal 
Comstock Act was passed in 1873, and twenty-four states subsequently passed similar 
laws banning or restricting the dissemination, advertisement, or use of contraceptives.202 
In the early 1900s, however, the modern birth control movement began.203 Women 
started to challenge the notion that their only purpose was to procreate and become 
mothers.204 As attitudes about sex changed, birth control became more widely accepted, 
and in the 1930s and 1940s, some states began to distribute birth control in their health 
clinics.205 In addition, in the early 1960s the FDA approved the birth control pill,206 and 
women across the country began to use it.207 At the same time, however, around twenty-
eight states still banned the use of contraception by married couples.208 In 1965, the 
Supreme Court, in Griswold v. Connecticut, finally declared laws banning the use of 
contraception by married couples unconstitutional, holding that such laws violated the 
privacy rights of married couples protected under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.209 
Fornication laws, which prohibited sexual relations outside of marriage, were first 
enacted in the United States by the colonists.210 Twenty-nine states have had fornication 
laws on the books at some point.211 In the eighteenth century, with changing attitudes 
                                                                                                                                            
regime regulating sexuality] was procreative marriage. Adultery and fornication laws insisted that sexual 
activities occur only within marriage; sodomy and seduction laws insisted that the sex be procreative”); see 
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omitted); Melissa Murray, The Space Between: The Cooperative Regulation of Criminal Law and Family 
Law, 44 FAM. L.Q. 227, 234 (2010) (“In this way, anti-sodomy laws were not solely about defining 
marriage as a heterosexual enterprise; they also were intended to clarify marriage's procreative purpose.”). 
200 People & Events: Anthony Comstock's "Chastity" Laws, PBS.ORG, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/e_comstock.html (last visited July 5, 2011). 
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Going, 68 MONT. L. REV. 299, 301 (2007). 
204 Chazan, supra note 202, at 273. 
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about sexual relations, the enforcement of fornication laws began to decrease.212 With the 
significant changes in sexual attitudes and the greater acceptance of sex outside of 
marriage in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century, 
“fornication laws gradually lapsed into desuetude.”213 Over the years, many state 
fornication laws have been repealed or deemed unconstitutional by judicial decree.214 
Many members of the legal community believe that the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision 
in Lawrence v. Texas, which struck down anti-sodomy laws as unconstitutional 
infringements on the liberty rights afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, makes fornication laws unconstitutional.215 Today, only thirteen states have 
fornication laws on the books, and, due in part to their questionable constitutionality and 
the fact that “society accepts fornication,” such laws are rarely, if ever, enforced.216                 
Sodomy laws, which were enacted to prohibit any type of non-procreative sex,217 
worked in conjunction with the laws that prohibited the use of contraception by married 
couples and the fornication laws that prohibited sexual relations outside of marriage to 
protect the procreation requirement of traditional marriage by maximizing the chances 
that married couples would procreate. At common law, sodomy was a criminal offense, 
and each of the original thirteen states had laws criminalizing sodomy.218 Originally, all 
sodomy laws proscribed non-procreative sexual conduct between members of the same 
sex and members of the opposite sex, although some of these laws were later amended to 
punish conduct only between members of the same sex.219 However, in the nineteenth 
century,220 although all fifty states had sodomy laws on the books, the significant changes 
in attitudes about sex resulted in increasingly rare enforcement of sodomy statutes against 
consenting adults.221  
In 1955, the American Law Institute (ALI) recommended doing away with all laws 
that penalized consensual, private sexual relations between adults.222 The ALI justified its 
recommendation on the grounds that such laws undermined respect for the law by 
penalizing conduct that a significant portion of the population engaged in, punishing 
private action that was not harmful to others, and encouraging blackmail.223 In 1961, 
Illinois became the first state to repeal its sodomy law.224 During the 1970s, nineteen 
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more states repealed their sodomy laws.225 By 1986, only twenty-four states prohibited 
sodomy,226 and this number had dwindled to thirteen by 2003.227 Among the thirteen 
states that still prohibited sodomy as of 2003 (four of which proscribed sodomy only 
between members of the same sex),228 all had a history of non-enforcement for private 
consensual sexual activity between adults.229 In its 2003 decision, Lawrence v. Texas, the 
Supreme Court struck down sodomy laws as unconstitutional infringements on the right 
to liberty guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.230 The 
Court reasoned that the Due Process Clause protects the rights of adults to engage in 
private, consensual sexual activity.231 
While the contraception, fornication, and sodomy laws, working in conjunction, 
were perhaps the most explicit reflection of the procreation requirement of traditional 
marriage, other laws maintained this requirement in more subtle ways. For example, 
beginning in the 1970s, a number of states passed “spousal notification laws” requiring 
married women to notify their husbands before obtaining an abortion.232 Other states 
passed more onerous laws, which required spousal consent in order for an abortion to be 
performed.233 One of the main justifications for such laws was the state’s interest in the 
procreative potential of marriage.234 The practical effects of such laws enhanced the 
possibility that procreation would occur within the marriages at issue, and, in some 
instances, likely mandated procreation within such marriages.235 
Spousal consent and notification laws received a great deal of criticism. Experts 
claimed that such laws produced great stress and anxiety for married women, and, in 
many cases, caused them to undergo physical harm.236 A woman who, for whatever 
reason, felt that she could not notify her husband about her decision, could be forced to 
resort to more risky means of aborting the fetus.237 Critics also argued that such 
requirements put women at an increased risk of physical or emotional abuse at the hands 
of husbands who did not approve of their wives’ intended course of action.238 Such 
requirements could be especially dangerous where the husband was not the father of the 
fetus.239 Others pointed out that under spousal consent laws, the husband would have 
complete veto power over his wife’s decision to have an abortion,240 and in marriages 
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with traditional power dynamics, spousal notification laws also meant the abortion 
decision would unjustly be taken completely out of the wife’s hands.241 Finally, many 
critics have argued that women should have the right to make such personal decisions 
about their bodies without consulting their husbands.242 
In 1976, the Supreme Court declared spousal consent laws unconstitutional in 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.243 Subsequently, in its 1992 decision in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court declared spousal notification laws 
unconstitutional.244 Citing the many criticisms of the laws discussed above, the Court 
reasoned in each case that the laws unconstitutionally infringed upon a woman’s 
fundamental right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.245 The Court further explained in Casey that the idea that women are the 
center of the home and family life with “special responsibilities that precluded full and 
independent legal status” was no longer consistent with the country’s understanding of 
families, individuals or the Constitution and referred to such statutes as embodying a 
“view of marriage consonant with the common-law status of married women but 
repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the rights secured 
by the Constitution.”246 
Finally, the legal system’s early failure to recognize spousal rape provides another 
manner through which procreation’s status as a requirement of traditional marriage was 
reflected.247 As one scholar has noted, “[i]mmunity from legal liability for forcible 
intercourse was a kind of implicit, albeit morally offensive, remedy of ‘self-help,’ where 
the failure of procreative expectation [implicit in the marriage contract] grew out of the 
partner’s withholding of intercourse.”248 The failure to provide criminal penalties for 
spousal rape not only increased the likelihood of procreation in marriages where 
husbands took advantage of the lack of legal protections or wives agreed to have sex 
because, as a legal matter, they had no choice, but it also sent the message to society that 
sex and the resulting procreation constituted fundamental aspects of marriage. As 
discussed earlier,249 such laws, which reflected the notion that the wife and her body were 
the property of her husband, became the subject of widespread criticism and were 
eventually eradicated in every state.250 
Since the emergence of a movement toward the acceptance of married couples’ 
choices to be voluntarily childless (or “childfree”) in the early 1970s, the number of 
married couples who reject procreation as a requirement of marriage has increased 
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significantly.251 Moreover, the number of married couples choosing to remain without 
children is expected to increase in the coming years.252 One researcher estimates that by 
the mid-2020s, ten to fifteen percent of women who are or have been married will have 
made the decision not to have children.253 A number of reasons have been set forth for 
the changes in attitudes towards procreation within marriage, such as the emerging view 
of marriage as a union for the purpose of personal happiness as opposed to childbearing, 
economic and environmental concerns,254 increasing career opportunities for women, 
society’s growing acceptance of married couples who choose not to procreate,255 and 
Americans’ increased placement of value on personal freedom and independence.256 
Overall, changes in the laws over the years have given married individuals significantly 
greater freedom to choose not to procreate, and research indicates that many of these 
individuals are exercising their freedom to make such choices. However, although most 
laws that seek to deny either or both spouses a meaningful ability to make the decision 
not to procreate have been repealed,257 today the legal notion of procreation as a marital 
requirement does live on explicitly in one form—through legislation and court decisions 
that deny same-sex couples the right to enter into legally recognized marriages on the 
grounds that same-sex marriage bans further states’ interests in promoting marital 
procreation.258  
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2. Recent Efforts by Same-Sex Marriage Opponents to Protect the Procreation 
Requirement of Traditional Marriage 
Many of the leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations are also working to 
protect the procreation requirement of traditional marriage. Some of the most direct 
statements aimed at protecting this requirement come from the Family Research Council. 
This organization has suggested that perhaps the benefits of civil marriage should be 
restricted to those individuals who marry during their time of natural, procreative 
potential.259 Maggie Gallagher suggests that the law should state that “[m]arriage is 
created by the freely-given consent of a man and woman, witnessed by church and/or 
state, to enter into a permanent sexual, financial, emotional, and parenting union,” and 
that couples who wish to marry should be required to sign an affidavit stating they 
understand these principles of marriage.260 Gallagher also has advocated for the 
introduction of policies that would encourage marital procreation by granting special 
benefits to marital families based upon the number of children in the family.261 
The manifesto, discussed earlier and signed by, among others, Gary Bauer, former 
president of the Family Research Council and current president of American Values, and 
Paul Weyrich, founder of the Heritage Foundation, advocates giving a variety of legal 
benefits to marital families based upon the number of children such families produce in 
order to “reward the birth of children and build true family patrimonies.”262 It also seeks 
to “end existing social insurance incentives toward childlessness.”263 With regard to other 
efforts to protect the procreation requirement of traditional marriage, Focus on the Family 
and the Family Research Council filed an amicus brief in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,264 urging the Court to uphold an abortion statute’s controversial spousal 
notification provision that the Court went on to declare unconstitutional.265 Finally, in 
2008, the Massachusetts Family Institute submitted testimony in opposition to a bill to 
repeal the crime of fornication, urging lawmakers to keeps laws that punish sexual 
relations outside of marriage on the books.266 
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Often, however, these kinds of efforts to encourage or require opposite-sex married 
couples to procreate are not the marital procreation-related efforts publicized by the 
leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations. Instead of alerting the public to such 
efforts, these organizations mainly publicize their efforts to maintain procreation as a 
core requirement of traditional marriage through the argument often used in anti-same-
sex marriage campaigns that same-sex marriage must not be legally recognized because, 
since same-sex couples cannot “naturally” procreate, these marriages would destroy 
traditional marriage.267 Overall, it is clear that many of the leading anti-same-sex 
marriage organizations continue to make concerted efforts to protect the procreation 
requirement of traditional marriage. 
D. Monogamy 
1. The History of the Monogamy Requirement of Traditional Marriage 
The monogamy requirement of traditional marriage was reflected in early U.S. laws 
and societal beliefs.268 The U.S. legal system protected the monogamy requirement of 
traditional marriage by, among other things, providing criminal and civil penalties for 
adultery. Such laws were often justified as necessary to protect the institution of 
marriage.269  
i. Criminal Penalties 
The Puritan colonists of New England, concerned with what they considered to be 
the moral corruption of England after it ceased providing criminal sanctions for adultery, 
were the first to reinstate the crime of adultery with a married woman.270 The crime was 
punishable by death.271 A number of other colonies followed New England’s lead and 
reinstated adultery as a crime.272 As the states developed, almost all created statutes 
criminalizing adultery.273 These laws varied widely.274 In a number of states, only 
married individuals could commit criminal adultery.275 Statutes such as this were based 
                                                
267 See, e.g., Jane Shaw Crouse, Five Myths About Same Sex ‘Marriage,’ CONCERNED WOMEN FOR 
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on the notion that adultery constituted a breach of the marital vow.276 Criminal adultery 
laws in other states, however, punished both the married individual and the unmarried 
participant.277 Finally, in some states adultery was a crime only if the married participant 
was female.278 This was premised on the assumption, reflected by the laws in place at the 
time, that a husband had a property interest in his wife and that laws criminalizing sexual 
relations with a married female protected that property interest.279 
Criminal prosecutions for adultery were common in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.280 During the twentieth century, however, enforcement decreased 
significantly.281 The ALI declared adultery laws “dead-letter statutes” in 1955, citing the 
lack of enforcement throughout the country and the belief that respect for the law is 
undermined when the law targets behaviors engaged in by a wide segment of the 
public.282 Reasoning that the penal law should not punish private immorality and that 
criminal adultery laws were ineffective and a waste of law enforcement resources, the 
ALI removed adultery from the Model Penal Code in 1962 and recommended that states 
follow suit and repeal their adultery laws.283 In the years following the ALI’s 
recommendation, many states decriminalized adultery.284  
As of 2011, adultery is not a crime in the majority of states.285 In the twenty-one 
states that still have the crime of adultery on the books, enforcement of these statutes has 
become exceedingly rare.286 Criminal adultery statutes have been criticized on a number 
of grounds. Such laws have been referred to as “archaic” and “difficult to enforce.”287 
Many legal scholars maintain that by punishing consensual sex between adults, criminal 
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penalties for adultery improperly infringe upon the constitutional right to privacy that the 
Supreme Court relied upon in Lawrence v. Texas to strike down sodomy laws.288 Others 
claim that because of the widespread prevalence of adultery—some studies indicate that 
as many as forty percent of wives and fifty percent of husbands will have sexual relations 
outside of their marriages,289 while other studies suggest the number is closer to twenty to 
twenty-five percent of all spouses290—it would be impossible to find impartial jurors for 
such prosecutions.291 Finally, while many people view adultery as morally wrong, 
“modern society . . . does not view extramarital sex as a crime against the citizenry.”292 
Proponents of adultery laws in the holdout states have stated that the threat of legal 
penalties for engaging in adultery helps protect the sanctity of marriage.293 
ii. Civil Penalties 
Throughout history, a variety of civil laws have reflected the status of monogamy 
as a core requirement of traditional marriage. For example, before World War II, the 
fault-based divorce system “threatened the adulterous spouse either with loss of financial 
support or punitively high support obligations [and] [a] wife’s adultery was also likely to 
be punished by the denial of custody of the children upon divorce.”294 Indeed, until states 
abolished the fault-based divorce system, the inclusion of adultery as one of the few 
grounds upon which divorce could be granted acted to discourage adultery.295 The early 
state statutes that labeled a husband’s murder of an individual caught in the act of 
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adultery with his wife justifiable homicide provides another example of the civil law’s 
promotion of the monogamy requirement of traditional marriage.296 
The civil laws that most directly reflected the monogamy requirement of traditional 
marriage, however, were based in tort law. Tort law remedies for the victims of adultery 
came into existence in the early years of the United States.297 The two major tort law 
causes of action for adultery were criminal conversation and alienation of affections.298 
Both torts provided to the victim of adultery a cause of action against the person who 
engaged in sexual relations with his or her spouse.299 These torts were created for the 
express purpose of protecting the institution of marriage.300 
Criminal conversation protected an individual’s interest in exclusive sexual 
relations with his or her spouse.301 To succeed in an action for criminal conversation, the 
plaintiff had to prove that: (1) a valid marriage existed between the plaintiff and the 
unfaithful spouse, and (2) adulterous relations occurred between the plaintiff’s spouse 
and the defendant.302 Criminal conversation was basically a strict liability tort303—the 
only defense available was that the plaintiff consented to the adulterous relationship 
between his or her spouse and the defendant.304 
The tort of alienation of affections was created to address injury to an adultery 
victim’s property, personal rights, person, or feelings.305 To succeed in this action, a 
plaintiff had to prove that: (1) at some point in the marriage true affection existed, (2) the 
affection that once existed had been destroyed, and (3) the defendant caused the 
destruction or impairment of the marital relationship.306 The plaintiff also had to 
demonstrate that the defendant actively and aggressively, with actual malice or improper 
motives, lured his or her spouse away from the marriage.307 Unlike the requirements of 
criminal conversation, adulterous relations between the spouse and the defendant were 
not necessary for an alienation of affections claim.308 Rather, any third party who in some 
way alienated the affections of the non-plaintiff spouse could be sued under this cause of 
action.309 Alienation of affections usually was harder to prove than criminal conversation, 
and a number of defenses were available to the defendant.310  
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Alienation of affections was first recognized as a tort action within the United 
States by a New York court in 1866.311 Soon after, every state except one recognized the 
tort of alienation of affections and a majority of states recognized the tort of criminal 
conversation.312 These early tort actions were available only to husbands.313 This was 
based on the historical view that wives (including their minds, bodies, and affections) 
were the property of their husbands and a husband’s property interest was violated when 
another person had sexual or otherwise intimate relations with his wife.314 Following the 
passage of the Married Women’s Property Act in 1882, some, but not all, states 
recognized a wife’s cause of action in tort for either alienation of affects or criminal 
conversation.315 In continuing to allow these causes of action even after wives were no 
longer considered the property of their husbands, courts explained that the torts played an 
important role in protecting the institution of marriage.316 
In the early 1930s, the torts of alienation of affections and criminal conversation 
began to decrease in popularity.317 In 1935, Indiana became the first state to abolish these 
torts.318 By 1981, thirty-two states had abolished the tort of alienation of affections and 
twenty-two states had abolished the tort of criminal conversation.319 Today, only eight 
states recognize causes of action for alienation of affections or criminal conversation.320  
Opponents of the adultery torts have offered a number of reasons for their 
abolition. Many claim that these torts, grounded in property notions that spouses 
(particularly wives) were chattel, are out of date with society’s views of sexual morality 
and the status of women and represent antiquated notions of people as property.321 Others 
point out that history indicates these torts are often misused for extortion and blackmail, 
as many individuals do not wish for allegations of adultery, even if untrue, to be a matter 
of public record.322 Finally, many opponents of the adultery torts have noted the failure of 
these tort actions to achieve their intended purpose of protecting marriage.323 
Specifically, opponents claim that these torts negatively affect possible reconciliation 
efforts of the married couples involved, hurt children by bringing additional tension, 
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publicity, and embarrassment to the already strained familial situation,324 and, as 
evidenced by the significant number of married individuals estimated to have sexual 
relations outside of their marriages,325 have no deterrent effect.326 
2. Recent Efforts by Same-Sex Marriage Opponents to Protect the Monogamy 
Requirement of Traditional Marriage 
Some of the leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations are also leading the 
charge to maintain, reinstate, or expand upon severe criminal and civil penalties for 
adultery in order to protect traditional marriage. For example, with regard to criminal 
penalties for adultery, in 2010 the Family Research Council reiterated its argument that 
adultery should remain a crime in order to “protect the institution of marriage.”327 The 
Family Research Council not only works to advance criminal anti-adultery measures that 
apply to general society but also works to advance anti-adultery laws within the military 
justice system.328 The Massachusetts Family Institute also strives to protect traditional 
marriage through efforts to maintain the criminalization of adultery. In 2008, the Institute 
submitted testimony in opposition to a bill to repeal the crime of adultery.329 The Institute 
argued that adultery laws “were put in place for good reason, and the good reasons still 
stand . . . [m]arriage deserves legal protection from outside seduction, and the sexual 
instinct of the young should be channeled into the constructive outlet of marriage.”330 In 
addition, other leading state-based anti-same-sex marriage organizations, such as 
Colorado Family Action, also work to maintain criminal punishments for adultery.331 
Many of the leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations also seek to protect 
traditional marriage through the maintenance of anti-adultery tort actions. For example, 
the Institute for Marriage and Public Policy’s website provides proposed model 
legislation establishing civil actions for adultery for a number of different states.332 The 
organization maintains that “[t]he proposed tort of adultery . . . permits an action to 
protect one of the gravest threat[s] to marriage, that being adultery by a spouse.”333 In 
addition, Maggie Gallagher has proposed that the adultery torts be updated to allow for 
lawsuits against “commercial enterprises that intentionally and explicitly attempt to profit 
from acts of adultery.”334 She has further suggested that the commercial solicitation of 
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adultery be treated as a crime.335 A number of the leading state-based organizations that 
work to ban same-sex marriage, such as the North Carolina Family Policy Council and 
New Hampshire’s Cornerstone Policy Research, also attempt to defeat bills aimed at 
repealing the adultery torts.336 Overall, it appears that the maintenance and reinstatement 
of criminal and civil penalties for adultery in order to protect traditional marriage remains 
an important goal among many of the leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations. 
III. ADDING THE PROPOSED PRO-SAME-SEX MARRIAGE FRAME TO THE DEBATE 
It has become clear that the popular vote will play a significant role in the same-sex 
marriage movement. The right to marriage for same-sex couples has been,337 and for the 
foreseeable future will continue to be, put to the popular vote.338 While significant 
advances in the same-sex marriage movement have occurred through court decisions and 
state legislative action, the results have been dismal for same-sex marriage proponents 
when the issue has been put to a popular vote. Ballot measures amending state 
constitutions to ban same-sex marriage have been passed in thirty-one states.339 The six 
states that have legalized same-sex marriage (as well as the District of Columbia) have 
done so through legislative action or court decision, not the popular vote.340 Thus, it is 
essential that same-sex marriage proponents do a better job of persuading voters.  
The success of a social justice movement, especially with regard to issues upon 
which the public will be voting, depends in significant part on how the issues are defined 
or framed.341 Often, each side sets forth multiple frames for an issue when a controversial 
policy question is being debated.342 Decisions about how to frame an issue, both initially 
and throughout the lifespan of a movement, can be critical, as “[i]ssue framing influences 
not only agenda access but also the issue dimensions that become the boundaries of 
choice and the evaluation of the problem,” and “[s]hifts in the issue dimensions 
understood to be important regarding a policy issue have the potential to produce 
[significant] changes in the public opinion.”343 Based on the results to date of the public 
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votes on this issue, it is clear that the frames set forth by same-sex marriage proponents 
need to be adjusted in order to reach a wider variety of voters.344 
This Part advances the argument that same-sex marriage proponents should add a 
new frame to their campaigns. Specifically, they should add a frame that educates the 
public about the true meaning of traditional marriage and exposes the efforts that anti-
same-sex marriage organizations are making to protect and advance the other 
requirements of traditional marriage—the traditional marriage agenda. It is important to 
note that the proposal does not involve using the new frame to replace the other frames 
set forth by same-sex marriage proponents, as many of the existing frames have been 
successful in reaching certain classes of voters (such as younger voters).345 Rather, the 
proposal involves adding another frame to the debate to engage voters who the other 
frames have thus far been less successful in reaching.  
A. The Protection Frame and Same-Sex Marriage Opponents 
The protection frame is one of the primary frames used by same-sex marriage 
opponents.346 The message to voters is that one type of marriage, traditional marriage, has 
existed throughout history and forms the foundation of society because it yields the 
greatest benefits.347 Thus, the protection frame posits that it is essential that traditional 
marriage be protected from redefinition.348 The protection frame also sets forth the 
related narrative that voters’ current or future traditional opposite-sex marriages need to 
be protected from same-sex marriage because opposite-sex marriages will be devalued or 
disadvantaged if same-sex couples are allowed to marry.349 The protection frame, 
encompassing these interrelated messages, has proven successful for same-sex marriage 
opponents in persuading a substantial number of voters, including voters who may not 
have had strong feelings about the issue initially but were influenced by how the issue 
was framed by each side.350  
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347 See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Same Sex Marriage, MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY 
INSTITUTE, http://www.mafamily.org/issues/marriage-and-family/same-sex-marriage/ (last visited July 5, 
2011) (“MFI is dedicated to restoring marriage to its natural definition. The costs to family, children and 
culture are too great to concede this battle to those who would see marriage and family redefined to the 
point of irrelevancy.”). 
348 See supra note 347. 
349 See, e.g., BARCLAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 214 (counting the number of times the frame that same-sex 
marriage is a threat to opposite-sex marriage was used in various same-sex marriage campaigns); Kenneth 
K. Hsu, Why the Politics of Marriage Matter: Evaluating Legal and Strategic Approaches on Both Sides of 
the Debate on Same-Sex Marriage, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 275, 303–04 (2006); The Slippery Slope of Same-Sex 
'Marriage,' FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=BC04C02 (last visited July 5, 
2011) (“How Does Gay Marriage Harm Your Marriage? One might as well ask, ‘How does my printing 
counterfeit $20 bills hurt your wallet?’"); Talking Points on Traditional Marriage, CONCERNED WOMEN 
FOR AMERICA, http://states.cwfa.org/images/content/TalkingPoints.pdf (last visited July 4, 2011) 
(“Homosexual marriage will devalue traditional marriage. Offering a counterfeit in exchange for the real 
thing always devalues the genuine”).  
350 See Hsu, supra note 349, at 300–06; Marriage Talking Points, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR 
MARRIAGE (July 5, 2011), 
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There likely are two related reasons for why the protection frame has resonated so 
well with voters: (1) it sets forth a cultural argument that is accessible and easily 
understandable to the general public, and (2) it gives voters a sense of personal stake in 
the issue. With regard to the first reason for the frame’s success in reaching voters, 
accessibility and understandability, the marriage the vast majority of the population have 
or anticipate having will fit within the more narrow understanding of traditional marriage 
that opponents overwhelmingly stress within the context of same-sex marriage 
campaigns—it will consist of one man and one women.351 (“One man, one woman” is a 
slogan often used by same-sex marriage opponents).352 The protection frame “reinforces 
this self-evident production of truth [regarding how a marriage should look] and the 
ahistorical idea that civilized marriage has always been as it is now.”353  
Thus, for most people, the protection frame is an easily understandable cultural 
frame. The argument is based on a cultural, albeit incomplete,354 understanding of how 
U.S. society has historically viewed marriage—an understanding that also happens to 
reflect most people’s everyday experiences. The frame is not based on a purely legal 
argument, which may be less accessible to voters (such as, for example, that there is no 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage under the Constitution). While legal arguments 
are obviously of great importance when presenting controversial issues before the courts, 
cultural arguments are often essential to the success of social justice movements in 
shaping public opinion.355  
The second reason for why this frame has resonated so well with voters is that it 
provides many people with a personal stake in the issue. As noted above, voters are told 
that their current or future opposite-sex marriages will be devalued and disadvantaged by 
same-sex marriages and thus that voting in favor of same-sex marriage runs counter to 
their personal interests.356 The idea that perceived self-interest often plays a part in 
voters’ decisions is certainly not a novel one.357 Although it has been examined and 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.nationformarriage.org/site/c.omL2KeN0LzH/b.4475595/k.566A/Marriage_Talking_Points.htm 
(“Extensive and repeated polling agrees that the single most effective message is: ‘Gays and Lesbians have 
a right to live as they choose, they don’t have the right to redefine marriage for all of us.’”).  
351 An estimated four percent of the U.S. population identifies as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. See Susan 
Donaldson James, Gay Americans Make Up 4 Percent of Population, ABC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/williams-institute-report-reveals-million-gay-bisexual-
transgender/story?id=13320565. 
352 See, e.g., Harry Jackson, Jr., One Man, One Women—Only, WASH. POST, May 10, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/09/AR2009050902323.html; Summer for 
Marriage Tour 2010, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MARRIAGE, http://www.marriagetour2010.com/ (last 
visited July 5, 2011); Robert H. Knight & Peter Sprigg, Marriage: One Man, One Woman, 
ORTHODOXYTODAY.COM, http://www.orthodoxytoday.org/articles2/KnightOneManWoman.php (last 
visited July 5, 2011). 
353 BARCLAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 246 (emphasis added). 
354 See supra Part II for a detailed description of the requirements of traditional marriage. 
355 ELLEN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND 
GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION 12 (2006); BARCLAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 230, 283–85. 
356 See supra note 349 and accompanying text. 
357 Carolyn L. Funk & David O. Sears, The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Political Attitudes, 24 ADV. 
IN EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 1, 1–2 (1991), available at http://www.issr.ucla.edu/sears/pubs/A101.pdf; LIBBY 
RITTENBERG & TIMOTHY TREGARTHEN, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS Chap. 15.3 (2009) (“Public 
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discussed in great detail in research and scholarship across the disciplines,358 the idea that 
perceived self-interest plays a role in peoples’ decisions also rests upon practical, 
everyday observations about human behavior. While it is beyond the scope of this Article 
to enter the debate regarding the precise amount of influence perceived self-interest plays 
in different types of voting decisions and it is important to acknowledge that many other 
things can affect voting decisions,359 it is hard to dispute the wide body of scholarly 
research that indicates perceived self-interest plays, or has the potential to play, a 
significant role in many peoples’ voting decisions.360 Overall, due to the protection 
frame’s accessibility, its clear connection to many voters’ lives, and its ability to provide 
a significant number of voters with a personal stake in the issue, same-sex marriage 
proponents have had difficulty responding to it in a direct and effective manner.361  
B. The Protection Frame and Same-Sex Marriage Proponents 
As researchers have noted, participants in same-sex marriage campaigns have spent 
a great deal of time and effort creating and advancing frames that respond to the various 
frames set forth by the other side.362 Same-sex marriage proponents have responded 
directly to many of the frames set forth by same-sex marriage opponents. For example, in 
response to the frame that same-sex couples already have enough protection and do not 
                                                                                                                                            
choice theory argues that individuals in the public sector make choices that maximize their utility—whether 
as voters, politicians, or bureaucrats, people seek solutions consistent with their self-interest.”). 
358 See Funk & Sears, supra note 357, at 1–4. 
359 See generally id. (discussing the role of ideology in voting decisions); Jonathan Baron, Cognitive Biases 
in Moral Judgments that Affect Political Behavior, SYNTHESE (2008), available at 
http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~baron/papers/synthese.pdf (discussing the role of moral judgment in voting 
behavior). 
360 See, e.g., Jonathan Baron, The “Culture of Honor” in Citizens’ Concepts of Their Duty, 24 
RATIONALITY & SOC. 37, 45, 63 (2012) (“[Studies] show that a norm of self-interest voting exists and can 
even be seen as a moral obligation. The last two studies ask about the particular sorts of policies that are 
supported when people see themselves as defending their self-interest.”); Richard D. Dixon et al., Self-
Interest and Public Opinion Toward Smoking Policies: A Replication and Extension, 55 PUB. OPINION Q. 
241, 241 (1991) (finding in a study that self-interest played a significant role in political attitudes toward 
public smoking restrictions); Funk & Sears, supra note 357, at 76 (reviewing a number of studies and 
finding that although self-interest played only a small role in political attitudes in many situations, it played 
a significant role where there were substantial and clear stakes or when there were “ambiguous and 
dangerous threats”); Larry D. Schroeder & David L. Sjoquist, The Rational Voter: An Analysis of Two 
Atlanta Referenda on Rapid Transit, 33 PUB. CHOICE 27, 27 (“The regression results strongly support the 
hypothesis that individual voters act in their own economic self-interest.”); Allyson Holbrook et al., 
Political Behavior of the Individual, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 226 (Alan E. Kazdin ed., 2000) 
(describing beliefs about self-interest as playing a role in voting decisions); Justin Esarey et al., What 
Motivates Political Preferences? Self-Interest, Ideology, and Fairness in a Laboratory Democracy 1, 23 
(Feb. 2011), available at http://myweb.fsu.edu/tsalmon/bes.pdf (“Our general finding is that votes for a 
redistributive tax are almost entirely in accordance with self-interest” and “that any preferences for fairness 
or inequality that our subjects possessed were not strong enough to overcome self-interest in this context.”). 
Moreover, in exit polling, many people claim that self-interest played a strong role in their decisions. Dale 
T. Miller & Rebecca K. Ratner, The Disparity Between the Actual and Assumed Power of Self-Interest, 74 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 51, 63 (1998). 
361 See infra notes 367–372 and accompanying text. 
362 BARCLAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 219–29. 
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need the right to marry,363 same-sex marriage proponents have highlighted many of the 
important rights that come with marriage, such as hospital visitation.364 Same-sex 
marriage proponents also have directly responded to one aspect of the protection frame—
the idea that same-sex marriage will hurt people’s current or future opposite-sex 
marriages—by denying that any harm would occur and calling on their opponents to 
identify a specific harm.365 Same-sex marriage proponents have not, however, responded 
to this aspect of the frame, which serves to provide many voters with a sense of personal 
stake in opposing same-sex marriage, with a counter-frame that would give voters a 
personal stake in supporting same-sex marriage.366 Moreover, same-sex marriage 
proponents have rarely responded to the protection frame’s primary contention that 
traditional marriage is the foundation of society and thus needs to be protected from 
redefinition.367  
Instead of responding directly to the argument that traditional marriage is the 
foundation of society and needs to be protected, same-sex marriage proponents have 
largely ignored this argument.368 In the limited instances where same-sex marriage 
proponents have responded to this contention, they have done so only indirectly through 
the broad argument that same-sex families are just as valid as traditional families.369 
Crucially, however, they have not challenged the use or meaning of the term “traditional 
marriage.”370 More specifically, same-sex marriage proponents have not sought to expose 
what protecting traditional marriage from redefinition really means to the leaders of anti-
same-sex marriage campaigns or how truly protecting or restoring traditional marriage 
would affect voters’ lives.371 Because issue framing is of such great importance in same-
sex marriage campaigns, failing to fully and effectively respond to a primary frame set 
forth by same-sex marriage opponents has likely come at a significant detriment to same-
sex marriage proponents.372  
                                                
363 Id. at 214, 218; Challenging Opposition Arguments, ACLU, 
http://gbge.aclu.org/relationships/challenging-opposition-arguments (last visited July 5, 2011) (discussing 
how to respond to the argument that LGBT people do not need more rights); Ron Prentice et al., Ballot 
Arguments, PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM http://www.protectmarriage.com/about/ballot-arguments (last visited 
July 5, 2011) (“Some will try to tell you that Proposition 8 takes away legal rights of gay domestic 
partnerships. That is false. Proposition 8 DOES NOT take away any of those rights and does not interfere 
with gays living the lifestyle they choose.”). 
364 See, e.g., Legal and Economic Benefits of Marriage, RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE,  
http://www.religioustolerance.org/mar_bene.htm (last visited July 5, 2011); Questions About Same-Sex 
Marriage, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/issues/5517.htm (last visited July 5, 2011); 
Equal Marriage NOW: Talking Points, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, 
http://www.now.org/issues/marriage/points.html#benefits (last visited July 5, 2011).  
365 BARCLAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 221. 
366 Id. at 214. 
367 Id. at 214, 223 (showing the results of a study indicating that while the same-sex marriage proponents 
had used the protection of the institution of marriage frame eighty-four times in the campaigns studied, 
same-sex marriage proponents had only responded within this frame once). 
368 Id. at 214, 223. 
369 Id. at 223. 
370 Id. at 214, 223. 
371 Id. at 214, 223. 
372 Id. at 227. 
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Instead of spending time and resources responding to the protection frame, same-
sex marriage proponents have focused primarily on the following three frames: (1) same-
sex marriage should not be banned because same-sex couples deserve equal legal rights 
and benefits; (2) discrimination against same-sex couples is wrong; and (3) same-sex 
marriage is a civil rights issue.373 Whereas the protection frame is an easily accessible, 
purely cultural frame, the frames most often used by same-sex marriage proponents are 
rooted in mixed legal and cultural notions of equal rights and non-discrimination—
notions that might not be as accessible to some voters.374 As noted above, purely cultural 
frames often have the greatest influence on voters.375 In addition, whereas the cultural 
and accessible protection frame has been used to give voters a personal stake in the issue 
by telling them that their current or future opposite-sex marriages will be harmed by 
same-sex marriage, the main frames set forth by same-sex marriage proponents rely on 
broad legal notions of equality for “others” and do not provide voters with a personal 
stake in the issue.376 Overall, same-sex marriage proponents have not only failed to 
respond fully and directly to the protection frame but have also failed to come up with a 
frame that provides an equally accessible cultural argument or gives voters a personal 
stake in the issue equal to that provided by the protection frame. Because of asymmetries 
such as these, same-sex marriage opponents have had far greater success in defining the 
issues and setting the frames of the same-sex marriage debate.377 
C. A Proposal for Addressing the Protection Frame 
To date, neither the same-sex marriage opponents’ definition of traditional 
marriage nor the traditional marriage agenda has been exposed by same-sex marriage 
proponents on any significant level during same-sex marriage campaigns.378 As it is 
currently used and understood in same-sex marriage campaigns, traditional marriage 
simply means a marriage between a man and a woman, which makes sense since the 
measures at issue aim only to define marriage as between a man and a woman.379 The 
other requirements of traditional marriage are largely ignored, except in the limited 
contexts where they are used to explain why the opposite-sex requirement of traditional 
marriage is important—i.e., marriage must be restricted to opposite-sex couples because 
same-sex couples cannot procreate.380 Otherwise, efforts to maintain the traditional 
                                                
373 See BARCLAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 214. 
374 See supra note 373 and accompanying text. 
375 See supra note 355 and accompanying text. 
376 See supra note 356 and accompanying text. 
377 See BARCLAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 230. 
378 See supra notes 368–370 and accompanying text. 
379 See Patti Brown, Minnesota Legislature Passes Constitutional Amendment Banning Same-Sex 
Marriage, THE IOWA REPUBLICAN, May 23, 2011, 
http://theiowarepublican.com/home/2011/05/23/minnesota-legislature-passes-constitutional-amendment-
banning-same-sex-marriage (“Thirty states have defined marriage in their constitutions as a union between 
a man and woman . . . .”).  
380 See supra note 267 and accompanying text; see also Robert Sokolowski, The Threat of Same-Sex 
Marriage, AM. MAG., June 7, 2004, http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=3627 
(“Those who argue against the legalization of same-sex marriages insist that marriage is ordered toward the 
procreation of children and that the legal supports given to marriage are given with that end in view.”). 
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marriage requirements of opposite-sex spouses, permanency, monogamy, gender roles, 
and procreation are not framed by anti-same-sex marriage campaigns as a package deal 
aimed at protecting traditional marriage.381 For example, anti-same-sex marriage 
organizations have not introduced measures to restore traditional marriage by banning 
same-sex marriage and also banning no-fault divorce, making adultery a felony, 
reinstating the law of coverture, and limiting marriage to only those couples who can and 
will procreate.382 Explicit measures to protect the other traditional marriage 
requirements—permanency, monogamy, gender roles, and procreation—are simply not 
emphasized in anti-same-sex marriage campaigns.383 
Instead, the efforts by anti-same-sex marriage organizations to maintain 
permanency, monogamy, gender roles, and procreation within marriage are often 
undertaken separately and through different, less public channels than the efforts to 
maintain the opposite-sex requirement.384 This is likely because with the significant 
changes to societal beliefs that have occurred over the years with regard to the law’s 
regulation of marital permanence, monogamy, gender roles, and procreation, the 
opposite-sex requirement of traditional marriage is the requirement that traditional 
marriage supporters have the most realistic chance of maintaining through the popular 
vote. It is, in essence, the last traditional marriage requirement still standing.385  
As the previous Part discussed, the broader traditional marriage agenda, although 
largely ignored in anti-same-sex marriage campaigns, is alive and well.386 There have 
been, and continue to be, significant efforts undertaken by the leading anti-same-sex 
marriage organizations to maintain the other requirements of traditional marriage.387 
These organizations are, among other things, undertaking efforts to ban no-fault divorce 
and promote covenant marriage, working to reinstate or maintain civil and criminal 
penalties for adultery, encouraging wives to stay at home and concentrate on their 
caretaking responsibilities, working in opposition to legislation aimed at promoting 
gender equality, and advocating efforts to use procreation as a basis for rewarding or 
penalizing married couples and to limit married individuals’ meaningful choice with 
regard to procreative issues.388 Since these other efforts are not often stressed or even 
referred to during same-sex marriage campaigns,389 the vast majority of voters likely are 
                                                
381 See supra note 379 and accompanying text. 
382 See Brown, supra note 379, for language of proposed ballot measures.  
383 See id. 
384 See supra Part II (detailing historical and recent efforts to maintain these other requirements of 
traditional marriage). 
385 See id. (tracing the history of the other requirements of traditional marriage); see also infra Part IV 
(discussing the current status of the other requirements of traditional marriage). 
386 See supra Part II.  
387 See id.  
388 See id.  
389 See supra note 368. Even when procreation or gender roles are offered explicitly as arguments for why 
same-sex marriage should be banned, same-sex marriage proponents have generally not responded directly 
to this criticism and exposed the implications that these requirements would have for opposite-sex married 
couples. See BARCLAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 214 (listing the commonly used frames in same-sex 
marriage campaigns). See generally Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk 
in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 97 (2005).  
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unaware of what the leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations are doing to protect 
the other requirements of traditional marriage.  
As previously noted, the protection frame has been so successful for same-sex 
marriage opponents because it has not yet been effectively challenged by same-sex 
marriage proponents, it is easily understandable and culturally accessible, and it gives 
many voters a sense of personal stake in opposing same-sex marriage.390 It follows that 
same-sex marriage campaigns would have greater success were they able to: (1) respond 
effectively to the protection frame, (2) create an accessible cultural frame to supplement 
the primarily legal frames they are currently using, and (3) construct a frame that 
provides voters with a greater sense of personal stake in the issue. Educating the public 
about the true meaning of traditional marriage and exposing the traditional marriage 
agenda could further all three of these goals. If traditional marriage was understood by 
the general public to encompass more than the singular requirement of opposite-sex 
spouses, this frame likely would be viewed differently by many individuals and, instead 
of hurting the same-sex marriage movement, could actually be used to help it. 
First, by exposing the traditional marriage agenda, same-sex marriage proponents 
finally would be responding fully to the protection frame, thereby rectifying the 
detrimental asymmetry that has resulted from the failure to respond directly and 
effectively to this important frame.391 Specifically, in educating voters about the true 
meaning of traditional marriage and the efforts currently being undertaken by the leading 
anti-same-sex marriage organizations to maintain or restore the other requirements of 
traditional marriage, same-sex marriage proponents would be directly responding to the 
protection frame by raising the important question of whether traditional marriage is 
really something voters would like to protect. The protection frame likely would take on 
a whole new meaning were voters to associate protecting traditional marriage with 
mandated marital permanence, monogamy, gender roles, and procreation.392 For many 
voters, the protection frame would not only take on a new connotation, but a negative 
one, were it associated with these other requirements of traditional marriage. This is 
because one or more of these requirements are out of step with many voters’ views of 
marriage, and, further, the reinstatement of such requirements would have the potential to 
negatively affect the lives of a significant number of voters.393 In addition to setting forth 
a direct and effective response to the protection frame, educating the public about the true 
meaning of traditional marriage and exposing the traditional marriage agenda could also 
provide pro-same-sex marriage campaigns with a new frame of their own that is 
culturally accessible and gives voters a greater sense of personal stake in opposing the 
efforts of the leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations.  
Second, educating voters about the same-sex opponents’ definition of traditional 
marriage and exposing the traditional marriage agenda would provide same-sex marriage 
proponents with a cultural frame that is easily accessible to voters. As noted above, 
                                                
390 See supra subparts III.1.A & III.1.B. 
391 See supra notes 367–368, 372. 
392 See supra Part II (detailing the historical and current efforts to maintain the other requirements of 
traditional marriage). 
393 See infra Part IV (identifying likely classes of individuals who may be negatively affected by the 
restoration of traditional marriage). 
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whereas the primary frames set forth by same-sex marriage proponents rely in significant 
part on broad legal notions, such as equality and non-discrimination,394 the protection 
frame advanced by same-sex marriage opponents is a purely cultural frame.395 
Dismantling the culturally accessible protection frame crafted by same-sex marriage 
opponents could provide same-sex marriage proponents with their own effective cultural 
frame. Educating voters about the true meaning of traditional marriage would 
demonstrate to voters that the way our culture and society view marriage has changed 
dramatically over the years.396 Voters would learn that U.S. society and culture have 
chosen repeatedly to reject traditional marriage by, among other things, allowing 
individuals to choose to end their marriages, removing legal penalties for adultery, 
granting women and wives equal rights and opportunities, repealing laws that mandate 
traditional marital gender roles, and removing restraints on married couples’ choices 
regarding procreation.397 Exposing the traditional marriage agenda would demonstrate to 
voters that the leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations are working towards a 
definition of marriage that our culture has in many ways rejected.398 In addition, many 
voters would see that they too have rejected many aspects of traditional marriage and 
would not favor a return to it.399 Thus, the cultural argument set forth by same-sex 
marriage opponents would quite possibly be turned on its head, resulting in an effective 
new cultural frame for same-sex marriage proponents—a frame through which 
proponents could show the widespread cultural rejection of traditional marriage. 
Finally, educating the public about the true meaning of traditional marriage and 
exposing the traditional marriage agenda would provide many voters with a greater 
personal stake in voting against same-sex marriage bans. One question that seems to have 
continually vexed same-sex marriage proponents is how to give voters who do not 
anticipate themselves or someone close to them wanting to enter into a same-sex 
marriage the type of personal stake in the issue that would lead them to vote in favor of 
same-sex marriage.400 Same-sex marriage proponents should take note of the success 
their opponents have had in using the protection frame to give voters a sense of self-
interest in opposing same-sex marriage and respond with a frame of their own that shows 
voters how supporting the traditional marriage agenda may actually undermine their 
personal interests. Alerting voters to the other requirements of traditional marriage and 
the efforts undertaken by the leading anti-same-sex marriage organizations to restore 
such requirements could be a helpful strategy in accomplishing this goal, since many of 
the requirements would affect certain classes of voters more directly and negatively than 
the opposite-sex requirement stressed in anti-same-sex marriage campaigns.401 
Specifically, if voters were educated about the true meaning of traditional marriage and 
the traditional marriage agenda, a significant number of them would discover that they 
                                                
394 See supra notes 373–374 and accompanying text. 
395 See supra notes 351–354 and accompanying text.  
396 See supra Part II (detailing the history of the traditional marriage requirements). 
397 See id. 
398 See id. 
399 See infra Part IV. 
400 See BARCLAY ET AL., supra note 1, at 214 (setting forth the main frames used by same-sex marriage 
proponents).  
401 See infra Part IV. 
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actually oppose the protection of traditional marriage because the restoration of one or 
more of the traditional marriage requirements is undesirable to them due to its potential 
effects on their daily lives. Thus, if same-sex marriage proponents were able to change 
the dimensions of the same-sex marriage debate such that the discussion focused on 
whether to support or oppose the traditional marriage agenda, a significant number of 
voters likely would feel a greater sense of personal stake in opposing efforts to ban same-
sex marriage. 
Determining the specific wording used to introduce the proposed frame to the 
general public will likely depend in part upon the circumstances surrounding the 
proposed measure, including its timing and location, as well as the voter demographics 
and political climate of the area in which it is being introduced. However, regardless of 
the particular circumstances surrounding the measure, there are certain core aspects of the 
basic message that should remain the same. Educating the public about the true meaning 
of traditional marriage and exposing the traditional marriage agenda must be done 
through a political message that is both concise and persuasive in order to effectively 
reach voters. As an initial, basic matter, voters need to understand that restricting 
marriage to a man and a woman is just one small part of a larger plan to protect 
traditional marriage by severely limiting marriage-related freedoms and turning back the 
clock to a form of marriage in which people lack freedoms that have been determined to 
be essential over the years—a form of marriage which our society has in many ways 
resoundingly rejected. Specifically, the message should educate people about the true 
meaning of traditional marriage by stressing that, as a comprehensive matter, supporting 
the concept of “traditional marriage” lauded by the anti-same-sex marriage campaigns 
means supporting a marital structure where men and women have to adhere to traditional 
marital gender roles and exist in separate spheres, people are severely limited with regard 
to their ability to leave unhealthy or unhappy marriages, those who engage in sex outside 
of marriages face severe criminal prosecutions and civil penalties, and married couples’ 
meaningful choice with regard to procreation is limited.402 In addition, while it would be 
impractical within the basic message initially advanced to educate voters as to every 
effort the traditional marriage proponents are currently taking to limit marital freedoms in 
order to protect traditional marriage, voters should be given concrete examples of the 
most significant and controversial efforts to reinstate the other requirements of traditional 
marriage. Subsequent messages advanced after voters have had a chance to absorb the 
initial message could then identify additional examples of efforts undertaken by the 
traditional marriage proponents to protect traditional marriage.  
Setting forth an initial message such as this that addresses the broad overall goals 
of the traditional marriage agenda is optimal for reaching the greatest amount of voters 
through one basic message. It is likely that many voters receiving this initial message 
regarding the litany of freedoms the traditional marriage agenda is working to limit in 
order to protect traditional marriage will focus on and remember the traditional marriage 
                                                
402 The goals of the traditional marriage agenda involve limiting the meaningful choice of married couples 
with regard to procreation by, among other things: institutionalizing a system that rewards married couples 
who engage in greater procreation and penalizes those who cannot, or choose not to, procreate; requiring 
spousal notification in the abortion context; and creating an environment where marriage without 
procreation is socially unacceptable. See supra notes 259–267. 
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agenda’s work with regard to a specific requirement or requirements that, based upon 
their personal interests, they deem to be the most undesirable. This means that even if the 
efforts of the traditional marriage agenda with regard to one of the traditional marriage 
requirements does not register with a particular voter as something to which he or she is 
strongly opposed, there is still a good chance that the efforts with regard to one or more 
of the other three traditional marriage requirements will resonate with that voter. Sending 
a message regarding the comprehensiveness of the traditional marriage agenda in 
restricting marriage-related freedoms across the board thus seems like the best strategy in 
terms of maximizing the number of voters reached through one initial message.  
After setting forth the initial message, however, in many cases it will make sense 
for subsequent messages to hone in on the traditional marriage agenda’s efforts with 
regard to just one or two of the traditional marriage requirements. This type of strategic 
decision would be made based upon voter demographics in the jurisdiction in which the 
vote is to occur and other relevant factors. For example, in a part of the country where 
relatively large numbers of women are attending college and graduate school and 
attaining success in the workforce and marital gender roles are widely viewed as a 
discriminatory relic of the past, same-sex marriage proponents could give extra attention 
to the gender role requirement of traditional marriage and the efforts of the traditional 
marriage agenda with regard to this requirement in setting forth the proposed message. 
Regardless of whether certain traditional marriage requirements are emphasized more 
than others in subsequent messages, however, the core underlying message advanced 
throughout the campaign with regard to the traditional marriage agenda will remain the 
same. Namely, that we as a country have decided that a form of marriage that grants the 
two individuals involved basic freedoms with regard to how they structure and exist 
within their marriage is not only optimal, but essential. The traditional marriage agenda, 
however, is trying to change this in a way that would affect many voters, including those 
who do not anticipate entering into a same-sex marriage, in specific concrete ways. For 
this reason, the traditional marriage agenda presents a threat that is much greater and 
more encompassing than most people realize, and therefore voters should be extremely 
wary of supporting it in any way. 
IV. IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL CLASSES OF VOTERS WHO WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE 
PROPOSED FRAME  
As the previous Part discussed, educating the public about the true meaning of 
traditional marriage and exposing the traditional marriage agenda would be an effective 
strategy for same-sex marriage proponents, in part because it would give many voters a 
greater personal stake in opposing the efforts of the traditional marriage agenda. More 
specifically, many voters would find that, based upon their personal interests, they 
actually oppose the protection of traditional marriage because the restoration of one or 
more of the traditional marriage requirements is undesirable to them due to its potential 
effects on their daily lives. This Part looks at each of the core requirements of traditional 
marriage discussed above, identifying specific classes of voters who are likely to oppose 
the traditional marriage agenda due to its effort with regard to that particular requirement. 
A. Classes of Voters Who Would Oppose the Traditional Marriage Agenda Due to Its 
Efforts to Protect the Permanence Requirement of Traditional Marriage 
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There are multiple classes of voters who would potentially feel a personal stake in 
opposing the traditional marriage agenda because of its attempts to maintain the 
permanence requirement of traditional marriage through efforts to repeal no-fault 
divorce, introduce pre-divorce waiting periods and mandatory counseling, require mutual 
consent for a divorce, and require couples to “show ‘good faith’ efforts or ‘due 
diligence’” to save their marriages.403 One such class of voters consists of married 
individuals considering divorce. It is estimated that at least forty percent of married 
individuals have considered leaving their spouses.404 People who have considered ending 
their marriage presumably have a personal stake in opposing legislation that makes it 
significantly more difficult, complicated, and costly to do so. In addition, the many 
individuals who anticipate getting married someday and who value the freedom that they 
would have to end their marriages, if necessary, without having to prove fault, obtaining 
their spouse’s consent, or undergoing waiting periods and mandatory counseling, would 
also likely have a personal stake in opposing this aspect of the traditional marriage 
agenda. The significant value placed on the freedom to divorce by individuals across the 
country is reflected by the failure of all but three states to adopt covenant marriage laws 
and the extremely low percentage of couples who have chosen to enter into covenant 
marriages in the states where they are available.405  
Another likely class of voters who would have a personal stake in opposing efforts 
to protect the permanence requirement of traditional marriage consists of individuals who 
have initiated or mutually agreed upon divorces with their former spouses. Today, 
roughly one in five adults has already undergone a divorce.406 Individuals who have made 
the decision to obtain a divorce most likely place great value on the freedom they had to 
do so and would not want to limit such freedoms in the future for themselves or their 
loved ones. Individuals who have been victims of emotional or physical abuse within 
marriage and have subsequently divorced abusive spouses seemingly would be especially 
likely to oppose efforts to require mutual consent, waiting periods, or proof of fault in 
order to divorce. Since over one-third of all adults between the ages of fifty and sixty-
nine have undergone a divorce,407 stressing the efforts of the leading anti-same-sex 
marriage organizations to protect the permanence requirement of traditional marriage 
could be an effective way for same-sex marriage proponents to reach older generations of 
voters. This is important because, as a class, older voters have been much more likely 
than younger voters to vote in favor of same-sex marriage bans.408 
                                                
403 See supra subpart II.A.2. 
404 Brent A. Barlow, Marriage Crossroads: Why Divorce Is Often Not the Best Option (Rationale, 
Resources, and References), 2 (2003), 
http://highplainscoalition.com/uploads/divorcemaynotbebestoption.pdf. 
405 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
406 See supra note 73 and accompanying text; Rose M. Kreider & Renee Ellis, Number, Timing, and 
Duration of Marriages and Divorces: 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 12 (May 2011), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p70-125.pdf. 
407 Kreider & Ellis, supra note 406, at 13. 
408 See Paul Steinhauser, CNN Poll: Generational Gap on Gay Marriage, CNN POLITICS (May 4, 2009), 
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/05/04/cnn-poll-generational-gap-on-gay-marriage/ (noting that, 
according to the CNN/Opinion Research Corporation poll, “[a]mong those 18 to 34 years old, 58 percent 
said same-sex marriages should be legal. That number drops to 42 percent among respondents 35 to 49 
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B. Classes of Voters Who Would Oppose the Traditional Marriage Agenda Due to Its 
Efforts to Protect the Gender Roles Requirement of Traditional Marriage 
There are likely a significant number of individuals who would have a personal 
stake in opposing the traditional marriage agenda’s efforts to maintain the gender roles 
requirement of traditional marriage. The traditional marriage agenda’s work in this 
context has included, among other things, opposing legal reforms that promote equality 
for women and wives, supporting legislation that casts husbands and wives into 
traditional gendered provider/dependent marital roles, and generally promoting and 
speaking out in favor of such roles.409 As Susan Appleton has noted, same-sex marriage 
campaigns have done little in terms of pointing out the connection between same-sex 
marriage rights and gender equality, even as same-sex marriage opponents have 
specifically cited the maintenance of traditional gender roles as part of the reason for their 
opposition to same-sex marriage.410 Exposing the traditional marriage agenda’s approach 
to gender roles could help same-sex marriage proponents to draw this connection for 
voters. 
The first likely class of voters who would have a personal stake in opposing the 
traditional marriage agenda’s efforts to protect the gender roles requirement of traditional 
marriage consists of married people who have chosen not to adhere to such roles. As 
current employment statistics demonstrate, today the vast majority of married couples do 
not adhere to the gender roles requirement of traditional marriage. The traditional marital 
situation—in which the husband is employed and the wife does not work outside the 
home—exists in only nineteen percent of marriages, and for the first time in decades, 
husbands are actually more likely than wives to be unemployed.411 Research indicates 
both that the majority of husbands believe “spouses should share breadwinning” and that 
in fact, husbands are taking on more housework than ever before.412 In most marriages 
both spouses work, and in 2009, working wives on average brought home about half of 
their families’ earnings.413 Whether their family structures are dictated by preference or 
necessity, married individuals who do not adhere to traditional marital gender roles 
would likely have a significant personal stake in opposing efforts to penalize or limit their 
choice to exist in such family structures. Moreover, certain research indicates that 
African-Americans are especially likely to exist outside of traditional marital gender 
roles, and thus a significant number of African-American voters may feel a sense of 
personal stake in opposing the traditional marriage agenda’s efforts to restore traditional 
                                                                                                                                            
years old, and to 41 percent for those 50 to 64 years of age. The poll indicates that only 24 percent of 
Americans 65 and older support recognizing same-sex marriages as valid.”) 
409 See supra subpart II.C.2 
410 See generally Appleton, supra note 389. 
411 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, supra note 176; Heather Boushey, Not Working: Unemployment Among Married 
Couples, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/05/pdf/maritalunemployment.pdf 1 (last visited July 5, 
2011). 
412 CELELLO, supra note 5, at 160; Gender Roles and Marriage: A Fact Sheet, NATIONAL HEALTHY 
MARRIAGE RESOURCE CENTER, 1, 3, http://www.healthymarriageinfo.org/docs/genderroles.pdf (last visited 
July 5, 2011). 
413 See Boushey, supra note 411, at 1–2. 
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gender roles.414 Since opposition to same-sex marriage has been comparatively high 
among African-American voters, drawing attention to the traditional marriage agenda’s 
efforts to maintain marital gender roles could help same-sex marriage proponents to 
engage voters who they have previously been unsuccessful in reaching.415 
Another large class of voters likely to have a personal stake in opposing the 
traditional marriage agenda’s efforts to restore traditional gender roles is men and women 
who anticipate possibly getting married but who do not anticipate subscribing to 
traditional marital gender roles. With more women than men entering institutions of 
higher education and women currently constituting about half of the overall workforce 
and more than half of all workers in high-paying management, professional, and related 
occupations, many unmarried women likely anticipate being employed during their 
marriages.416 Moreover, many unmarried men likely anticipate that their future wives will 
work outside of the home. In fact, research indicates that today most men and women 
disapprove of traditional marital gender roles417 and approve of wives earning more than 
their husbands.418  
In addition, the gender role-related efforts of the traditional marriage agenda, if 
successful, would affect not only husbands and wives, but also unmarried men and 
women (regardless of whether they anticipate getting married) by, for example, keeping 
men and women from being protected by equal rights legislation and sending the 
message to society that traditional gender roles and separate spheres for men and women 
are optimal.419 Thus, women and men who in some way do not adhere to traditional 
gender roles would feel a sense of personal stake in opposing the gender role reinforcing 
efforts of the traditional marriage agenda. Overall, there it is likely that a wide variety of 
individuals would feel a significant sense of personal stake in opposing the traditional 
marriage agenda due to its efforts to protect the gender roles requirement of traditional 
marriage. 
C. Classes of Voters Who Would Oppose the Traditional Marriage Agenda Due to Its 
Efforts to Protect the Procreation Requirement of Traditional Marriage 
Alerting the public that the traditional marriage agenda is not just paying lip service 
to the procreation requirement of traditional marriage by relying on it to oppose same-sex 
marriage but instead actively pursuing the protection of this requirement through other, 
non-related avenues would likely provide many individuals with a personal stake in 
                                                
414 Gender Roles and Marriage, supra note 412, at 4; Bahira Sherif Trask, Traditional Gender Roles, 
SLOAN WORK & FAMILY RESEARCH NETWORK ENCYCLOPEDIA (2006), 
http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/encyclopedia_entry.php?id=3816&area=All. 
415 William Saletan, Original Skin: Blacks, Gays, and Immutability, SLATE (Nov. 13, 2008), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2204534/ (reporting that seventy percent of African-American voters voted in 
favor of the same-sex marriage ban in California in 2008); Shelby Grad, 70% of African Americans Backed 
Prop. 8, Exit Poll Finds, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2008), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2008/11/70-of-
african-a.html. 
416 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, supra note 174.  
417 Sharon Jayson, Gender Roles See a ‘Conflict’ Shift in Work-Life Balance, USA TODAY, Mar. 26, 2009, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2009-03-26-work-life-balance_N.htm. 
418 Linn, supra note 171.  
419 See supra subpart II.C.2. 
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opposing the traditional marriage agenda. The most obvious class of voters who would 
feel a sense of personal stake in opposing the traditional marriage agenda’s efforts to 
maintain the procreation requirement consists of married individuals who have decided to 
remain childless. As noted earlier, married couples are increasingly making the decision 
not to have children.420 Although societal acceptance of voluntary childlessness is 
increasing,421 couples who have made the decision to remain childless report feeling 
stigmatized and devalued by society.422 The traditional marriage agenda’s efforts likely 
result in greater stigmatization for such individuals, as the agenda continually engages in 
efforts to send the message that procreation is the core purpose of marriage and the duty 
of married couples, promotes legislation that would reward families for procreating by 
disseminating benefits based upon the number of children a married couple has, and 
supports limitations on the rights of married individuals to choose not to procreate.423 
Thus, married individuals who are voluntarily childless likely would feel a significant 
sense of personal stake in opposing the traditional marriage agenda’s efforts to encourage 
or mandate that married couples procreate. 
A similar class of voters who would likely have a personal stake in opposing the 
traditional marriage agenda’s efforts to protect the procreation requirement of traditional 
marriage consists of unmarried individuals who anticipate possibly getting married but do 
not plan to have children. Like married couples who have decided to remain childless, 
unmarried individuals who anticipate possibly getting married and who plan to remain 
childless likely would feel a sense of personal stake in opposing the traditional marriage 
agenda’s efforts to protect the procreation requirement of traditional marriage by, among 
other things, granting benefits to married couples based upon the number of children born 
to the marriage.  
Unmarried individuals who have children and individuals who anticipate possibly 
having children while unmarried also likely would feel a sense of personal stake in 
opposing the traditional marriage agenda’s efforts to protect the procreation requirement 
of traditional marriage. In recent years, around forty-one percent of all births in the 
United States were to unmarried mothers,424 and thirty-six percent of women who gave 
birth were separated, widowed, divorced, or never married.425 As noted above, the 
traditional marriage agenda has advocated rewarding married couples based upon the 
number of children they bear in order to encourage marital procreation.426 Unmarried 
individuals with children presumably would feel a strong sense of personal stake in 
opposing policies that disadvantage their families, by rewarding their married 
counterparts, but not them, for engaging in exactly the same behavior—bearing children. 
                                                
420 See supra notes 251–253. 
421 Chancey, supra note 251, at 2. 
422 Eddy Sass, Re-constructing the Image of the Voluntarily Childfree: An Ethnographic Exploration of 
Media Representation and the Childless by Choice, 5 (June 1, 2004) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University 
of South Florida), available at scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2236&context=etd. 
423 See supra subpart II.D.2. 
424 FastStats: Unmarried Childbearing, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2011), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarry.htm. 
425 Katie Zezima, More Women Than Ever Are Childless, Census Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/19/us/19census.html. 
426 See supra notes 261–262 and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, the traditional marriage agenda’s strong messages regarding procreation as the 
purpose of marriage, the duty of married individuals to procreate, and the marital 
husband-wife family structure as the optimal family form, likely add to the stigmatization 
faced by unmarried individuals who have children.427 
Another possible class of voters who would have a personal stake in opposing the 
traditional marriage agenda’s efforts with regard to procreation would consist of married 
couples and individuals who plan to marry but are involuntarily childless as a result of 
infertility or age. It is estimated that approximately seven percent of married couples are 
infertile.428 Research indicates that individuals who are involuntarily childless often 
report feeling stigmatized, alienated, and isolated.429 While some leaders of the traditional 
marriage agenda have expressed disagreement with the notion that since procreation is a 
requirement or purpose of marriage, couples who cannot have children should not be 
allowed to marry,430 at least one of these organizations has suggested the possibility of 
restricting marriage to couples in their procreative years431 and has stated that “society's 
interest in marriages that do not produce children is less than its interest in marriages that 
result in the reproduction of the species.”432 Moreover, it is likely that the messages sent 
by the traditional marriage agenda touting the necessity of marital procreation and 
promoting policies that reward families based upon the number of children they have, add 
                                                
427 Shirley H. Liu & Frank Heiland, Should We Get Married? The Effect of Parents’ Marriage on Out-of-
Wedlock Children, ECON. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 6, 17), available at 
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RESEARCH COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?i=PV07E01 (last visited July 5, 2011) (promoting 
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to the sense of isolation experienced by many married couples who cannot procreate. 
Consequently, many individuals who are involuntarily childless may feel a personal stake 
in opposing the traditional marriage agenda due to its efforts to maintain procreation as a 
requirement of marriage. 
D. Classes of Voters Who Would Oppose the Traditional Marriage Agenda Due to Its 
Efforts to Protect the Monogamy Requirement of Traditional Marriage 
There are also certain classes of voters who likely would feel a sense of personal 
stake in opposing the traditional marriage agenda due to its efforts to maintain the 
monogamy aspect of traditional marriage through the promotion of criminal and civil 
penalties for adultery.433 It is estimated that a substantial percentage of spouses engage in 
sexual relations outside of their marriages.434 Based on the prevalence of such conduct, it 
is unsurprising that most Americans do not believe adultery should be criminalized.435 It 
seems unlikely that individuals who have engaged in sexual relations outside of marriage 
would vote in favor of criminal or civil penalties for such behavior; rather, such 
individuals presumably would have a significant personal stake in ensuring that such 
practices were not penalized.  
In addition, some married couples agree to structure their marriages to permit 
outside sexual relationships.436 Research has indicated that as many as five to six percent 
of married couples have such arrangements.437 Individuals who are in these kinds of 
marriages or who anticipate possibly having such an arrangement with a spouse in the 
future likely would feel a sense of personal stake in opposing criminal or civil penalties 
against married individuals for engaging in sexual relations outside of their marriage. 
In sum, if voters are educated about the true meaning of traditional marriage and 
the traditional marriage agenda is exposed, the leading anti-same-sex marriage 
organizations will seemingly have two options: (1) acknowledging the full definition of 
traditional marriage and standing behind their efforts to maintain the other requirements 
of traditional marriage, thereby changing voters’ understanding of the protection frame 
and providing more voters with a sense of personal stake in opposing the traditional 
marriage agenda,438 or (2) abandoning their efforts to maintain the other requirements of 
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traditional marriage, telling voters that they do not seek to maintain all of the 
requirements of traditional marriage—only the opposite sex requirement, and ceasing to 
use the protection frame. Either option benefits same-sex marriage proponents. If the first 
option is pursued, pro-same-sex marriage campaigns benefit because same-sex marriage 
opponents’ primary frame will take on a negative connotation for many voters, and more 
voters will have a personal stake in opposing the traditional marriage agenda. Same-sex 
marriage proponents also would benefit under the second option, because the primary 
frame set forth by same-sex marriage opponents, which has proven so effective in the 
past, would disappear along with some of the most frequently used arguments against 
same-sex marriage: the necessity of maintaining the traditional marriage requirements of 
gender roles and procreation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In order for the same-sex marriage movement to attain greater success, it must do a 
better job of swaying public opinion on the issue and engaging voters it has struggled to 
reach in the past. The issue of same-sex marriage has been, and will continue to be, put to 
a popular vote. Educating the public about the true meaning of traditional marriage and 
the full scope of the traditional marriage agenda will provide an effective response to one 
of the primary frames set forth by anti-same-sex marriage campaigns and inject pro-
same-sex marriage campaigns with an accessible cultural frame that gives a wider variety 
of voters a sense of personal stake in the issue. 
Even those in the feminist and queer communities who disfavor marriage as a legal 
category should not be opposed to the strategy set forth here. As Suzanne Kim recently 
noted, advances in marriage equality work to dismantle the characteristics of traditional 
marriage, such as gender hierarchy, that are often critiqued by those who oppose 
marriage as a legal category.439 The particular strategy advanced here, exposing the 
traditional marriage agenda, helps to do this work as well—it challenges and works 
toward the explicit societal rejection of many of the objectionable traditional marriage 
requirements. 
Overall, it is time to challenge the notion of protecting traditional marriage. In 
today’s society most people exist in marriages that are a far cry from the true traditional 
marriages of the past. The definition of marriage advanced by U.S. society and the legal 
system has changed drastically over the years. Acknowledging these changes will pave 
the way for a new, more inclusive definition of marriage. It will also lead to a societal 
reevaluation of the kinds of relationships that should be deemed worthy of legal 
recognition. Even if state legislatures and courts continue to advance marriage equality, 
the movement will not achieve full success, either as a matter of legal recognition or 
societal acceptance, until it does a more effective job of reaching the public. 
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